

Exposing the Concept of Power

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Abstract

In this paper, a contribution is made to exposing the concept of power - defined in general terms as 'the ability to achieve'. Insights from different traditions of power research are brought together in a single conceptual analysis. The concept is first analyzed in terms of capacities, structures, and forms of power. This is followed by an analysis of personal agency, using insights from cognitive and social psychology. Next, different ways of power exercise are discussed on the basis of literature dealing with social control, legitimation, and social influence. After a brief discussion of power effects, an analysis of situations, fields, strategies, and interaction follows, relating ideas from game theory to other relevant analyses. Finally, the focus turns to collective agency (in organizations), which is analyzed on the basis of insights and categories from the human resource management literature.

The centrality of the concept of power in the social sciences has been noted by many scholars, but the development of an integral concept has been left somewhat wanting. Different traditions of power research have tended to focus on different aspects of the concept. Thus, some scholars have focused on capacities, structures, or forms of power and/or the exercise of power (e.g. Lukes, 1995; Poggi, 2001; Scott, 2001), while others have focused on personal or collective agency - whether or not with reference to situations, strategies, and interactions (e.g. March and Simon, 1993; Rasmusen, 2001; Smith, 2002). In this paper, I aim to contribute to exposing the concept of power - defined here in general terms as ‘the ability to achieve’ (Morriss, 1987) - by bringing these different aspects of the concept together in a more encompassing analysis. I first analyze the concept in terms of capacities, structures, and forms of power. I then turn to the analysis of personal agency, primarily based on cognitive and social psychology. The next section discusses different ways of exercising power, bringing together insights from the literature in sociology dealing with social control, legitimation, and social influence, and the social influence literature in psychology. After a brief discussion of power effects, I turn to the analysis of situations, fields, strategies, and interactions, relating some ideas from game theory to ideas from other disciplines. Finally, I turn to the analysis of collective agency, on the basis of the ideas elaborated in the preceding sections, together with insights from the literature on human resource management (HRM) - in the broad sense of the management of people by people in an organization, group, or network (Strauss, 2001). As the scope of the HRM literature is huge, by necessity I touch only briefly upon its main categories. Although the linear conceptual exposition ends with the discussion of collective agency, the different elements of the concept of power are interconnected. Thus, for instance, collective agency underlies powerstructures and interaction, while the effects of power underlie personal agency and power structures - and so on. It needs to be said that any analysis of power can always be improved upon. Still, I hope to provide a fair insight into the concept. An operationalization of elements of the concept for the empirical analysis of social life falls outside the scope of this paper. An overview of the concept of power as presented in this paper is shown in figure 1.

Insert Figure 1 about here

1. Capacities, Structures, and Forms of Power

Power is based on sources of power, which may be material, personal, or social. Power means represent the forms in which powersources are used. The system of powersources of a person or institution forms a powerbasis. In a situation in which one actor has power over another actor, the powercapacity of an actor consists of the difference between the actor's powerbasis and the powerbasis of the other actor with regard to an issue in a particular time period. Powercapacity may also refer to 'power to', or the ability to achieve something - whether or not in cooperation with others (Morriss, 1987; Scott, 1994). A powercapacity has a certain magnitude - the extent to which an actor can achieve something (Dahl, [1968] 1986). Lukes' (1974) three dimensions of power in decision-making - to prevail in conflict, prevent the taking of decisions, and influence psychological states - are powercapacities.

A powerstructure is constituted by a system of powercapacities. It consists of a rank-ordering of actors in terms of some criterion of power. Forms of political or economic organization such as autocracy, oligarchy, democracy, codetermination, anarchy, monopoly, and oligopoly are powerstructures. Superior positions in powerstructures have been referred to as elite, hegemony, or domination, while the position of a subjected actor has been labelled subordination (Weber, [1922] 1972; Simmel, [1950] 1986; Morgan, 1986; Scott, 2001). According to Emerson ([1962] 1970), power resides in the other's dependency. Subordinates are never wholly dependent upon the powerful, and the powerful are never independent of subordinates. Ties of mutual dependence imply that each party is in a position to facilitate or hinder the other's gratification (Goldman, [1972] 1986; Knights and Willmott, [1985] 1994). Weber ([1922] 1972) stresses the importance of the conflictual relationship, in which action is oriented intentionally to carrying out the actor's will against the resistance of others. Forms of conflict include contention, protest, controversy, opposition of interests, and competition. Conflict may be built into structures and roles (Frey, [1971] 1994; Morgan, 1986; March and Simon, 1993; Scott, 2001).

Powerstructures may be stable because they are taken-for-granted. Relationships, roles, rules, norms, traditions, habits, routines, action patterns, values, and symbols may be internalized resulting in conformity. People may become resigned to a low status, while members of privileged groups may grow convinced that they have the right to a high status and command. Existing powerstructures may be considered legitimate, while alternative powerstructures may be regarded as unrealistic (Weber, [1922] 1972; Mosca, [1939] 1970; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1994; Child, 1997). Interdependence between social phenomena may mean that change in one aspect requires change in other aspects, leading to

stable powerstructures. Actors may feed of the power of others, which stabilizes the power holder's power. People may also make commitments based on existing powerconstellations, leading to path dependence. Efforts at change may be resisted because they threaten security, increase the cost of information processing, and disrupt routines. Finally, powerstructures may be stable because of the exercise of power, or because receivers of power signals anticipate the exercise of power, and act accordingly (Martin, [1971] 1994; Morgan, 1986; Powell, 1991; Pierson, 1997; Scott, 2001). Powerstructures may be instable, as when powerholders are replaced by others when powersources change. Powerholders may also be removed from power through attacks or revolutions. The legitimacy of a powerstructure may be called into question (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Pareto, [1935] 1970; Mosca, [1939] 1970; Haferkamp, 1976; Scott, 2001).

Poggi (2001) distinguishes three forms of power. Political power implies the power to command. It rests upon a superior's ability to sanction coercively the subordinate's failure to comply. Economic power refers to the ability to influence the behavior of others derived from the possession of resources. Subjects are formally free and motivated by their own interests; influence takes place by means of exchange (Weber, [1922] 1972). Ideological/normative power is the ability to influence the ideas, values, and norms of others. This ability is based on the status of the powerholder. Political power supports economic power by the promise to defend property rights and to enforce contracts. Reversely, economic power supports political power by underwriting the financial needs of political power. Ideological/normative power can impart legitimacy to political power. In its turn, political power may supply the coercive means needed for ideological/normative power. Economic power is supported by status and commitment resulting from ideological/normative power (Jessop, [1969] 1994). Reversely, economic power can supply ideological/normative power with the funds it needs. But forms of power may also undermine each other in reverse processes of those described.

2. Personal Agency

I will use the term 'personal agency' to refer to the relationship between psychological characteristics and behavior. My discussion of this relationship will to a large extent be based on the integrative work of psycho-therapist Donald Ford (Ford, 1987; Ford and Ford, 1987; Ford and Urban, 1998). Ford's work shows the complexity of personal agency, especially if contrasted with rational choice approaches. This means that it is difficult to arrive at generally applicable analyses, and it implies a need for individual, historical, and social specificity.

While this may seem an imposing problem at first, in particular to those used to rational choice, the realities of marketing and management have shown it to be well-surmountable.

There exists a broad spectrum of human goals (Ford, 1992; Schwartz, 1994). People usually try to achieve a variety of goals through a single strategy and behavior pattern. But while goals may be clear, stable, and compatible, they may also be vague, instable, or incompatible. The pursuit of short-term goals may go at the expense of intermediate and long-term goals. People may misunderstand the goals guiding their current activity, or they may only discover them while acting. Faulty goal content, organization, or awareness is likely to lead to ineffective behavior. While goals or values may relate systematically to behavior, what is desired may just as well never become expressed in deeds (Hofstede, 1984; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Steers and Porter, 1991; Simon, 1995; Smith and Schwartz, 1997).

In deciding how to reach goals, information is selectively gathered and action plans are constructed, evaluated, and selected. Information which fits existing cognitions is readily assimilated, but information that is discrepant creates a conflict between conceptions and perceptions. Such discrepant information may be rejected or reinterpreted, or existing conceptions may be reorganized to allow for accommodation. In the end, selected information merges with activated cognitive structures to guide behavior. If a merger meets certain conditions of satisfaction, a problem is felt to be solved. Alternatively, an alternate merger may be tried, new information may be sought, or a person may abandon the effort or revise the aspiration level. The limits to thinking abilities and the real costs of thinking imply that only a few consequences of an action are considered before it is undertaken. In addition, decision-makers have limited and/or ambiguous information about ends and means. In effect, they often accept the first satisfactory solution. Because of such 'bounded rationality', many different choices may be consistent with specific goals. Subgoals may replace 'ultimate' goals, while self-judgments of inadequacy in the face of a prospective undertaking may lead a person to forgo the effort. Where past actions led to positive consequences, people may repeat them; where they led to negative consequences, people may avoid repeating them. In addition, the choice of courses of action depends on whether or not the value of an outcome exceeds the expected cost of obtaining it (Goldman, [1972] 1986; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Skinner, 1988a; March and Simon, 1993; Simon, 1995; Conlisk, 1996; Child, 1997).

Individuals may develop habitual approaches for addressing problems, called problem-solving heuristics. Such habits may be applied inappropriately. People may also implement the first option that occurs to them without considering its utility or reviewing other options. Decisions may be made intuitively, randomly, or erroneously. People may remain indecisive

for so long that the opportunity for effective action eludes them. People may avoid problem-solving domains, strategies, and procedures because of risk-aversion or negative emotional experiences. Values may make certain options unthinkable, while privileging others. Vocabularies, communication structures, attitudes, beliefs, rules, norms, and procedures exert an influence on decision-making processes, and decisions may be compelled or coerced (Brand, 1984; Morgan, 1986; Etzioni, 1991; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; March and Simon, 1993; Levcine, 1995; Conlisk, 1996; Kahneman, 2003).

In the search for action programs to achieve goals, variables within personal control are considered first. If a satisfactory program is not discovered, attention is turned to variables that are not under personal control. If a satisfactory program is still not found, an effort is made to relax the criteria the program must satisfy. Sometimes, a preferred alternative cannot be identified. Individuals prefer the continuation of present action programs over change, unless the present course is unsatisfactory. This may lead decision makers to resist evidence (Davis, 1979; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; March and Simon, 1993). Reversely, having made a decision, people may feel sorry and change their decision (Lewin, [1958] 1964).

An intention is the subjective probability that a person will perform some behavior. Personal goals - together with perceptions, cognitions, beliefs, attitudes, norms, emotions, thinking, strategies, expectations of consequences, possible courses of action, and environmental conditions - may lead to intentions, which yield actions (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Davis, 1979; Brand, 1984; Skinner, 1988a; Simon, 1995; Lonner and Adamopoulos, 1997). According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), a person's intention is primarily determined by that person's attitude to performing the behavior, together with beliefs that certain referents think the person should or should not perform the behavior. The person's attitude to performing the behavior is determined by beliefs that it will lead to certain consequences and by the evaluation of those consequences. Other factors are thought to influence intentions only indirectly. The relation between an intention and the corresponding behavior is influenced by the degree to which carrying out the intention is under the person's control. When the person does not possess the required powersources, the intention may change. Actions may also be performed unintentionally - this includes reflexes and actions done from strong emotion or while drugged or hypnotized. Some actions are compulsive, commanded, or coerced. Sometimes an action occurs from force of habit. Actions may also come from sudden impulse. Actions may be conscious or not; they may be performed in a state of ignorance, by accident, by mistake, recklessly, or by intuition (Weber, [1922] 1972; Connolly,

1974; Davis, 1979; Poser, 1982; Brand, 1984; Etzioni, 1991; March and Simon, 1993; Phesey, 1993; Smith and Stevens, 1996; Lonner and Adamopoulos, 1997).

Instrumental actions aim to produce some intended consequence. Observational actions focus on information collection, organization, and retention. Communicative actions consist of the communication of information. Complex actions are composed of sequences of different action types. In thinking episodes, all action functions are inhibited and replaced by abstract thought, and imagined perceptions and actions (Haferkamp, 1976; Friedland and Alford, 1991; March and Simon, 1993; Levine, 1995). In their actions, people simultaneously influence and are influenced by their environment. Influences from the environment include actions, rules, norms, customs, knowledge, and values. The connection between values and behavior becomes stronger when acting according to one's values is considered legitimate by others (Lewin, [1958] 1964; Smith and Schwartz, 1997). When a stimulus from the environment has been experienced repeatedly in the past, the response is routinized. When a stimulus is novel, it evokes problem-solving activity. The need to cope with such uncertainty leads actors to rely on traditions, habits, stereotypes, signs, orders, organizational rules, rituals, power relations, values, styles, symbols, informal bases of association, and standards of honor (Geen, 1989; March and Simon, 1993; Offe, 1996). While performing an action, the flow of the behavior pattern is monitored to effect revisions, although decisions are rarely re-examined and some actions occur too rapidly for correction. Over time, the aspiration level tends to adjust to the level of achievement. Past achievement, the achieved levels of others, and norms of reference groups provide a basis for adjusting aspirations (Davis, 1979; Brand, 1984; March and Simon, 1993).

Personal agency is supported by an actor's control of powersources. Aspirations, dispositions, appreciations, thought patterns, and strategies of action are linked to the social position of actors. Actions are also shaped by an actor's personality traits and physical abilities. Overall, the exercise of power through personal agency depends on available resources and the willingness to use them (Dahl, [1968] 1986; Davis 1979; Brand, 1984; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Sewell, 1992; Scott, 1994). An actor may succeed, but people often fail to do the things they intend to do. People may change their minds, forget, or find themselves unable. An action may fail to achieve its goal because of ignorance, error, lack of information, or wrong information. Computational limits of the brain may cause a gap between intended goals and results, and actions may be short-circuited by a person's affective state. Actions may succeed by sheer luck, or by effort. They may also have different consequences than expected (Rothschild, 1971; Davis, 1979; Brand, 1984; March and Simon,

1993; Simon, 1995). Every action incurs opportunity costs, in the sense that it excludes the possibility of doing something else. The knowledge that unchosen alternatives have favorable aspects and that the chosen alternative has unfavorable aspects are dissonant with the knowledge of the choice made. In such a situation, dissonance may be reduced by an increase of the evaluation of the chosen alternative and/or a decrease in the evaluation of the unchosen alternatives (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; March and Simon, 1993).

3. The Exercise of Power

Power can be exercised in several ways. In what I call 'social control', power is exercised without changes in the psychological characteristics of the subject. In 'legitimation', an attempt is made to convince a subject that commands and obedience are rightful - thus constituting systems of authority. Attempts to change a subject's perceptions, goals, preferences, beliefs, attitudes, cognitions, motives, and thereby his or her behavior will be referred to as acts of 'social influence'.

3.1. Social Control

Social control includes force, coercion, manipulation, and the use of authority. When it is effective, it results in obedience. Social control may be delegated or it may be established through forms of participation. Countervailing power may exist, which may lead to conflict.

'Force' is defined by Lukes (1995) as 'physical activity directed at people's bodies or property which, when successful, prevents them from acting in certain ways, or places them in a certain desired situation, eliminating their resistance, and in the extreme case, their existence'. Force also secures compliance indirectly by signalling the prospect of more force. It increases the credibility of threats to use it. Force against one subject deters noncompliance on the part of others. The exercise of force may lead to fear in subjects, establishing patterns of cognition and action. When these patterns are rationalized they become taken-for-granted. The use of force can only be maintained as long as commands to use it are obeyed. Moreover, a situation imposed by force is often provisional. The use of force is also uneconomic in terms of a high expenditure of resources. And the exercise of force may stimulate resistance. Martyrs may be produced and alternatives may become visible. Force may pay when an opponent is weak, but not when the opponent is strong and able to mobilize counter-force

(Durkheim, [1893] 1926; Walker, [1943] 1971; Lukes, 1986, 1995; Tully, 1988; Scott, 1994; Archer, 1996; Poggi, 2001; Scott, 2001).

‘Coercion’ may be defined as ‘the securing of compliance of another or others by means of threats, or negative sanctions’ (Lukes, 1995). This includes the threat of force, extortion, fining, and ridicule. Powerholders may possess a staff to whom the exercise of sanctions is delegated. Coercion leads to compliance only with a credible threat. It is more economical than force, but the compliance obtained from subjects remains involuntary and unreliable. It may also lead to resistance and hostility. Applying sanctions to acts that are taken for granted may indicate that alternatives exist. The use of coercion may also destroy compliance out of reference and obligation. Finally, the greater the use of coercion, the greater may be the dependence on a staff (Durkheim, [1893] 1926; Walker, [1943] 1971; Olsen, 1970; Zucker, [1977] 1991; Lukes, 1986, 1995; Scott, 1994, 2001).

Lukes (1995) defines ‘manipulation’ as ‘the securing of compliance of another or others by the strategic use of an art or skill.’ He distinguishes two kinds of manipulation. The first implies altering a situation so that a course of action becomes less attractive. The second attempts to change agents’ wills, wants, intentions, preferences, or beliefs - and thus constitutes social influence. The first kind of manipulation is seen to encompass inducement, divide and conquer, and heresthetic. Inducement is defined by Lukes as ‘the art of securing one’s objectives or position by the making of offers; by bribing or suborning or co-opting others’. Forms of inducement include compensation and social approval. Inducement is effective as long as rewards are regularly provided. Because subjects feel they benefit, the results of inducement can be stable (Walker, [1943] 1971; Galbraith, [1984] 1986; Scott, 2001). Tokenism is a form of inducement, in which potential leaders of hostile groups are coopted by a ruling group. This deprives the groups of their leadership material, and it may win the loyalty of subjects. Members of hostile groups may become reconciled to their positions if they believe they may be able to rise out of their condition (Baran and Sweezy, [1966] 1971; Olsen, 1970; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Levine, 1995).

Coercion and inducement may be used together. According to Bandura (1977, 1986), a behavior followed by punishment is less likely to occur again, while a behavior followed by a reward is more likely to recur. Rules constitute a combination of coercion and inducement. They may be protected by threats and sanctions, supported by inducement, or they may be taken for granted. They include legal rules; rules of formal organizations; and norms, customs, and moral codes. While legal rules rest upon potential coercion by the state, norms, customs, and moral codes rest upon social approval and disapproval. Rules both enable and

constrain action. Powerful actors may attempt to produce or bargain rules to stabilize their situation, and they may impose rules on others. Any rule is ambiguous and subject to negotiation or subversion (Walker, [1943] 1971; Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991; Knights and Roberts, [1982] 1994; Tilly and Tilly, 1994; Fligstein, 1997a, 1997b).

Divide and conquer is defined as ‘preventing, discouraging, and distorting communication between subject or rival actors’ (Lukes, 1995). It fragments or limits potential or actual power bases (Weber, [1922] 1972; Albrow, [1972] 1994; Morgan 1986). It includes the separation of powers, as well as the introduction of competition. Powers can be divided so that different power bases are operated by people with different competences and interests; function according to different rules; can operate autonomously for certain purposes; and require the cooperation of others for other purposes. This constitutes a system of ‘checks and balances’ (Riesman, [1951] 1970; Albert, [1960] 1971; Wrong, 1994; Poggi, 2001). A powerholder may abandon alliances or form new ones. Dependence of others may be increased and dependence on others may be reduced. Authority may be reallocated repeatedly (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Mosca, [1939] 1970; Morgan, 1986).

‘Heresthetic’ is defined by Lukes (1995) as inducing others to join in alliances and coalitions by structuring voting situations. He mentions three heresthetic techniques: agenda control, strategic voting, and the manipulation of dimensions. In agenda control, by deciding what is decided, how it is decided, and in what order, agendas can be implemented that generate victories for particular alternatives (Bachrach and Baratz, [1963] 1994). ‘Strategic voting’ refers to the abandonment of a most preferred choice for a second-best choice, when this leads to the defeat of an opponent. In the manipulation of dimensions, an issue on which an opponent is confronted is shifted, thereby upsetting a position in which the opponent has a majority.

There are several other manipulation techniques. Actors can shape issues and objectives by contributing to the discussion on which decisions will be based. Decisions can be avoided or delayed by redirecting attention. The claim can be made that the reactions of others must be taken into account. Lying, deceit, hypocrisy, and the use of spies may help to attain or maintain power. Ignorance may be maintained, and contradictory ideas may be concealed. Subjects may be distracted from the exercise of power. Ideas may also be imposed through mystification and naturalization. Power may be preserved by making situations look uncertain or particularly good, by corruption, racketeering, imitation, secrecy, and by the use of intoxicating substances (Tzu, [6th Cent. BC] 1988; Aristotle, [335 BC], 1981; Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Packard, 1957; Olsen, 1970; Rothschild, 1971; Morgan, 1986; Friedland and

Alford, 1991; Archer, 1996; Poggi, 2001). Symbolism and signals may be used to enhance power - as in being late for an important meeting. Rhetorics may be used to attract attention and thereby promote an issue on policy agendas. Defining enemies may help maintain the powerstructures of a collectivity, and create unity and a feeling of purpose. And a leader of a hostile group may be branded subversive, while other actors may be stigmatized and degraded (Baran and Sweezy, [1966] 1971; Morgan, 1986; Pizzorno, 1987; Stern, 1990; Wrong, 1994). Ideas of hostile groups may be dismissed by devaluation, dismissal, and ridicule. A 'correct' interpretation of words may be determined so as to exclude an opponent from using the same words to say something else (Koselleck, 1985; Archer, 1996). A powerholder may supply (mis-)information on advantages and/or disadvantages connected with policies (Harsanyi, [1962] 1971).

Another way of exercising power consists in the use of authority. Weber ([1922] 1972) defines authority as entailing the power to command and the duty to obey, based on beliefs in legitimacy. In his analysis, rational-legal authority rests on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Traditional authority is based on a belief in the sanctity of traditions and the legitimacy of those elevated to authority under such traditions to issue commands. Charismatic authority rests on a devotion to the sanctity, heroism, or exemplariness of the leader - and the order revealed or created by that person. The leader is obeyed as a result of his or her charisma - a quality seen as exceptional. In the exercise of power through authority, a person may obey a command because its content is judged legitimate, or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate procedure. Beliefs in legitimacy may be the result of affections, values, connections to salvation, traditions, or constellations of interests. They may be established or activated by means of empathy, inspiration, or rational persuasion (Weber, [1922] 1972; Lipset, [1960] 1970; Bachrach and Baratz, [1963] 1994; Lukes 1974).

People may obey a powerholder as a result of physical force; the presence of certain affections, fears, hopes, values, habits, customs, or beliefs; rational considerations of self-interest; a sense of duty; or a belief in the legitimacy of the powerstructure. Rationalization may also play a part in obedience, as every person who is oppressed may still imagine that he or she yields obedience to him- or herself only. And obedience depends upon situational factors. Subjects usually comply only to some extent with the powerholder's wishes. When power is seen as illegitimate, disobedience may occur. Disobedience may also result from considerations of self-interest (Machiavelli, [1519] 1981; Weber, [1922] 1972; Harsanyi, [1962] 1971; Olsen, 1970; Lukes, 1986; Scott, 1994; Bardi and Schwartz, 1996).

By means of delegation, power may be exercised through intermediary actors. Powerholders may consult subordinates or allow them to participate in decision-making. Elections, initiatives, referenda, and impeachments may allow for countervailing power. Subjects may set limits to the number of subjects and issues and to the range of options of the powerholder; they may destroy the powerholder's powersources; or they may seek to supplant the powerholder. Subjects may suppress influence attempts, they may protect or rebel. They may resort to 'voice' or 'exit'. Powerholders may also restrain the use of power themselves because they believe they ought not to use whatever power they command in every situation (Pen, [1959] 1971, [1966] 1971; Olsen, 1970; Scott, 1994).

A divergence of interests may lead to conflict over resources, powerstructures, rules, authority, actions, ideas, or decision-making areas. Conflict may also result from poor knowledge, misunderstanding, and error. It may arise over the interpretation of words. Pressures toward joint decision-making and the devaluation or injuring of others can lead to conflicts as well. Conflicts may become enduring through the formation of attitudes, stereotypes, values, beliefs, and rituals. They may end when actors recognize that their aims cannot be attained at a reasonable cost (Coser, [1961] 1964; Olsen, 1970; Koselleck, 1985; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Morgan, 1986; Friedland and Alford, 1991; March and Simon, 1993; Levine, 1995; Archer, 1996; Gudykunst and Bond, 1997).

3.2. Legitimation

Legitimations may be advanced by powerholders to convince subjects that commands and obedience are rightful - thus constituting systems of authority. Such legitimations may take the form of discourse, ideology, theoretical traditions, myths, beliefs, and rules (Durkheim, [1893] 1926; Mosca, [1939] 1970; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Lukes, 1973, 1995; Matheson, [1987] 1994; Archer, 1996).

By means of discourse, social categories are created, maintained, and revised. Labels may be affixed to activities and actors to make them valuable and to mobilize commitments, or to make them less valuable. Evaluative language may be used to legitimate activities (Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991; Skinner, 1988b; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Scott, 2001). Discourses may be stimulated or suppressed, split into what is 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable', and divided into 'true' or 'false.' Thus the production of discourse is constrained by requirements that must be fulfilled if speakers want to be taken seriously. Other requirements include obligatory language and behaviors, as well as the use of shared

doctrines. The proponents of discourses seek to recruit and secure the adherence of others, while the significance of oppositional ideas may be belittled (Howard, 2000; Poggi, 2001).

An ideology consists of a set of assertions, theories, doctrines, beliefs, and aims, that constitutes a political program (Merriam-Webster, 1993). It may legitimize, rationalize, and naturalize powerstructures, actions, and commitments, and enhance certain interests. It may provide actors with an identity, and enable collective agency. Alternative ideologies may be censored or incorporated, or ideologies may be reformulated to negate the claims of a rival. Projects and conduct may be tailored to fit the existing ideology. Conceptual innovation depends on its fit with existing ideology, the extent to which ideologues control the instruments of dissemination, and on power relations (Willer, [1967] 1994; Koselleck, 1985; Skinner, 1988b; Tully, 1988; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Levine, 1995; Archer, 1996; Howard, 2000; Poggi, 2001).

Theories such as the divine right to rule, the legitimacy of oligarchies, the power of ‘the people’, ‘majorities’, or legislative assemblies, or the idea of universal suffrage may be used to legitimate a powerstructure. Claims of superiority in terms of character, intellect, and wealth may be used as legitimating devices. Inequalities of power may be rationalized or naturalized. The disadvantages of superiority may be stressed, and the benefits of subordinates may be emphasized. Force may be legitimated by the claim that it is exercised with reluctance. Hope or fear may be evoked to make subjects feel obliged. Sacred ideas and practices may serve as normative prescriptions, and rituals, titles, and symbols may be used. Sharing suffering and displaying vulnerability, modesty, and approachability may also legitimate a powerstructure. Another strategy consists of emphasizing that individuals exercise power qua holders of offices. Legitimacy may be based on formal votes or informal agreements. It may be achieved by referring to precedents, reference groups, or organizations, or by feigning respect. It may be achieved by layering a powerstructure. Claims to shared identity or solidarity may be used, and appeals may be made to trust the powerholder. The reputation of a group may be enhanced by depriving an opposing group of standing (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Olsen, 1970; Crouch, 1993b; Miller, 1997; Poggi, 2001; Scott, 2001).

Criteria used to judge whether someone has authority include age, gender, status, wealth, success, credentials, functional roles, or reputation. These criteria may of course be counterfeited (Veblen, 1899; Lukes, 1995; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). According to Arendt ([1969] 1986), the greatest enemies of authority are contempt and laughter.

3.3. Social Influence

Attempts to change perceptions, goals, preferences, beliefs, attitudes, cognitions, motives, and thereby behavior, constitute acts of social influence (Lukes, 1974; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Social influence may focus on perception, emotions, motivations, behavior, or cognitions. It may be oriented at a single subject or it may be more large-scale. It may be effective or lead to resistance.

Repeated exposure can arouse liking, although overexposure can occur. Short exposures can have an effect when emotions are aroused, but complex messages benefit from long exposures. Initially presented information is more influential than subsequent information, and a slight variation can increase the influence of a message. Influence may result from intense exposures as well as from subliminal stimuli. Positioning, colors, tone of voice, sound effects, and impression management can also have an influencing effect. A variable may be paired with positive or negative stimuli. Subjects may be presented with a role model to stimulate imitation. An unwanted influence may be prevented by distracting the attention of subjects (Packard, 1957; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Bandura, 1977, 1986; Morgan, 1986; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Simon, 1995).

In social influence through emotions, people may be influenced by people and stimuli they like. By connecting such people and stimuli to information, people, or objects, the latter may become influential as well. Trust can be elicited by truthfulness or the impression of such. Symbols which stand for trusted persons or organizations can be linked to variables in order to create favorable attitudes. Positive attitudes towards stimuli can be created through optimism; excitement; and awe - as by the use of spectacles. Positive attitudes can also be evoked by a soothing voice, a warm or cheerful atmosphere, sympathy, patience, reassurance, rewards, and beautiful objects. Feelings of happiness, contentedness, tranquility, and sexuality can be connected to influencing messages. The evocation of desire or greed may also lead to influence. A feeling of obligation may be aroused by creating reciprocity, or by assigning blame. People may be influenced by arousing fear: an illness may be connected to actions; reactance may be generated; punishments may be used. Subjects may be influenced by the promise of security; the reduction of fear, anxiety, guilt-feelings, loneliness, sorrow, or grief; the release of tension, impatience, hatred, anger, aggression, or frustration. The effect of social influence through emotions is enhanced by ambiguous arousal - as a result of marching, singing, and shouting; time pressures; isolation; and personal experiences of attitude objects (Packard, 1957; Frijda, 1986; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Cialdini, 1993; Scott, 2001).

Influencing variables can be connected to motivations concerning music, fun, sex, intimacy, tenderness, oral comfort, sports, health, immortality, nourishment, warmth, comfort, luxury, glamour, 'God's will', freedom, approval, friendship, responsibility, reciprocity, material gain, and safety. The idea may be promoted that a change in a certain direction is easy, that a variable contains new information, that the subject is privileged, or that the subject's self-esteem will be enhanced. A promise may be made of creative outlets, power, status, or belonging. Reactance may be aroused by threatening a person's sense of freedom. Influencing variables can be connected to several motives by the claim that they are consistent with a person's identity (Packard, 1957; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Ford, 1992; Cialdini, 1993).

Subtle situational forces, together with unconscious habits, can make people act contrary to their attitudes and values. When such behavior takes place, people may attribute their behavior to their own dispositions. This may lead to cognitive dissonance, requiring changes in cognitions. If it is difficult to change knowledge of behavior, attitudes or values may change. For behavior to lead to cognitive dissonance, people must have the idea that they chose freely to perform the behavior, and that they are personally responsible for its consequences. Influence may also take place as a result of small rewards and punishments for behaviors. Large rewards and punishments justify behavior, rather than leading to changes in attitudes or values. Obedience to a command or conformity to norms may lead to attitude or value change when self-attribution takes place (Festinger, 1954; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991).

In compliance, social influence takes place on the basis of wrongly applied heuristics. Cues are provided signifying the relevance of a particular rule, while careful thinking is prevented or discouraged. The heuristic of reciprocation states that one should try to repay in kind what another person has provided. On this heuristic is capitalized in gift giving - when a sense of obligation is induced; by the 'door-in-the-face' technique - in which a large request is followed by a smaller request, as a concession to be reciprocated; and by the 'that's-not-all' technique - in which a proposal is 'improved' in order to stimulate reciprocation. The reciprocation rule is also activated in alliance formation. If recognized, abuse of the reciprocation rule can lead to reactance. The heuristic of commitment and consistency states that once someone makes a choice, that person will encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment. This heuristic is activated in the 'foot-in-the-door-technique' - in which gaining compliance with a small request increases the chances of obtaining compliance with a large request; the 'low-balling' technique - in which a

proposal is made less attractive, counting on a person's commitment to the more attractive deal to go along; and in the use of public oaths of allegiance. Social influence working through the commitment and consistency heuristic is more effective if the commitment is made publicly, and if it is felt to have been made freely. In the heuristic of social proof, people look at similar others to determine what is correct. This heuristic plays a part in attempts to influence others by looking and behaving similarly, in examples of behavior, and in the use of the credentials of people belonging to a target group. Other heuristics include: the heuristic equating big or expensive with best; perceptual contrast, which makes a request look smaller if made after a larger request; word cues, such as 'because', which have a positive effect on obedience to a request; and symbolism, such as nodding, which leads a subject to be influenced (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Packard, 1957; Parsons, [1963] 1986; Giddens, 1984; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Cialdini, 1993; Scott, 1994).

Active participation influences subjects through contact or interaction with others. Since subjects rarely question their observations, participation may produce changes in cognitions. In role-playing, subjects adopt the role of another person. In such a situation, they develop arguments supportive of the role. The effect of role playing is stronger when the role player is forced to search actively for arguments in favor of the role, and when role-playing is improvised (Packard, 1957; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991).

Persuasion consists of presenting arguments and facts to convince an audience. Attitudes can be changed by changing beliefs or evaluations. If beliefs associate behavior with positively evaluated attributes, the person's attitude becomes more positive, and vice versa. Providing information that others hold a given expectation or perform a behavior may lead a subject to infer that these referents think he or she should perform the behavior. Attempts can be made to limit the impact of intervening events. Thus, an attempt to change the actor's intention can be made immediately prior to the time of desired behavior change. The credibility and referential importance of a communicator influences acceptance of a message. Persuasion is relevant when information is important and unfamiliar. When messages are complicated, they are most persuasive in written form. In other cases, speech may be more effective. Persuasion may produce permanent and reliable motivational changes (Olsen, 1970; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991).

A message may become influential by connecting it to ideology or widely held values (Blum, 1989; Stern, 1990). The themes of confidence, optimism, novelty, contentment, agreement, and quality may also increase the persuasiveness of a message. Unwanted actions

may be claimed to have perverse effects, or to be impossible or futile. Attitudes may be made to feel obsolete, and subjugation and inequalities to appear natural or unchangeable. Euphemisms may be used. Social influence attempts can also be effective by simply asking for one's wishes - as in lobbying. The posing of questions in ways that elicit agreeable answers may lead to social influence as well. Another quality that can increase the effectiveness of a message is to 'keep it simple' (Russell, [1938] 1986; Packard, 1957; Lukes, [1976] 1977, 1995; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991). Other rhetorical techniques include: saying something has already been done or will be done soon; that whether something happens depends on the other; that there may be other causes of a phenomenon; that someone who is virtuous has nothing to fear; and that the other is right while turning the argument around. People may be tempted by promises, by calling them cowards, or into talking with the same speed. Reference may be made to an authoritative source, information may be brought out at strategic moments, and others may be flattered, worn down, or pinned down on their own discourse. Expressing disappointment or contempt may influence others.

Propaganda - defined as 'sets of symbols which influence opinion, belief or action' (Merton, 1968) - is a large-scale social influence technique. A 'startling fact' may draw attention, while pseudo-facts may supplant facts. Stereotypes may be used, and enemies may be presented as evil. The content of propaganda needs to correspond to the wants of the audience. Material which is effective for some may be ineffective or back-lash for others. An ideology may be disseminated through the media, educational, and religious institutions, providing a moral justification for the exercise of power (Lenski, [1966] 1986). In rites of passage, an individual or group is detached from a social condition and impressed with characteristics, rights, and obligation of a new situation. Such rites and other ceremonies reinforce overall collective identity (Turner, [1967] 1987; Pizzorno, 1990). In charismatic periods, charisma disrupts rules and traditions. Changes in socialization lead to changes in values. Subsequently, routinization of rules, traditions, and value-constellations occurs (Weber, [1922] 1972). Religion may promote solidarity, obedience, and morale (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Levine, 1995). Influence may aim at the group of which the subject is a member. This activates group coercion. The categorization of subjects into groups causes an accentuation of similarities and differences, with positive attitudes towards group members. This leads to intragroup cohesion, and shifts towards ingroup norms. A self-categorization may be evoked which activates a particular group identity. A subject may also identify with the influencer (Packard, 1957; Frey, [1971] 1994; Turner and Oakes, 1989; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

Social influence is more effective when messages are connected to existing cognitive schemes. Data supporting existing attitudes tend to be accepted, while nonsupportive findings are rejected. If social influence runs contrary to existing mental schemes, novelty or systematic thinking may enhance its effect. The latter may be activated by making a message relevant, making a person accountable, or confronting people with their values. Information that values contradict those of a positive reference group and resemble those of a negative reference group may lead to a change in values. Influence processes can also aim at changing a person's self-concept. Answering questions may bring people to see themselves differently (Rokeach, 1973; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Turner, 1991; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Cialdini, 1993; March and Simon, 1993; Waller, 1994).

If social influence is recognized and perceived as deliberate, it may lead to reactance. In addition, the values people hold, and the intensity with which they hold them, set a limit to persuasion attempts. Individuals resist influence more strongly the further they are to depart from group standards. Influence may also be prevented, by generating reasons for not agreeing with a message (Packard, 1957; Lewin, [1958] 1964; Etzioni, [1968] 1970; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991; Cialdini, 1993).

4. Powereffects

The exercise of power leads to powereffects. As each and every action is an exercise of power, all effects of actions in principle constitute powereffects. Thus, the exercise of power may lead to changes in institutions, rules, actions, personal elements, as well as in nature. It may lead to an increase in power itself. But it may also lead to a diminution of power because of the use of resources. In order for an actor to achieve powereffects, it may be necessary to exercise power actively. But an actor may also enjoy powereffects caused by others. These powereffects may be intentional or unintentional. In the exercise of power, what is important is the values held by those in key positions and their readiness to exercise power. Such powerholders may make decisions with long-term impacts. But they may be unable to maximize their preferences because of the complexity of situations. And their work may be undone, when their positions are taken over by new powerholders with different values (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Hobbes, [1651] 1996; Olsen, 1970; Lukes, 1986; Morgan, 1986; Morriss, 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Pheysey, 1993; Scott, 1994; Bardi and Schwartz, 1996; Fligstein, 1997b).

5. Situations, Fields, Strategies, and Interactions

Powerstructures, agency, the exercise of power, and powereffects come together in situations and fields, where strategies and interactions determine outcomes. Situations and fields consist of sets of actors and their characteristics, roles, relations, rules, and interactions with regard to particular issues, spaces, and time periods. Situations occur in one specific point in time and (virtual) space, while fields expand over time and space. Policy domains are fields of political action, where actors meet to form and implement policy through a process of decision-making. As Fligstein (2001) has argued, ‘the market’ may also be considered a field, where the issue is the selling or buying of goods or services on the basis of property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control. Strategies designate the way an actor intends to act to attain an end on the basis of beliefs of how others will act and how others think the actor will act. They designate the sources and means of power to be used, and the ways in which power will be exercised. Part of the development of a strategy is an assessment of one’s own characteristics, the characteristics of others, and the environment. After a strategy has been determined, preparations may take place aimed at implementing the strategy. Based on implicit or explicit strategies, and with different states of preparations and ways of power exercise, interactions take place (Tzu, [6th Cent. BC] 1988; Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Lynch, [1946] 1971; Olsen, 1970; Lukes, 1986; Scott, 1994; Fligstein, 1997b; Poggi, 2001).

Interaction may take the form of coordination, cooperation, bargaining, exchange, competition, or conflict. It may be based on the exercise of power or on orientation to shared values and norms. Coordination implies bringing different actors into a common action or condition, while cooperation indicates actors working together. Long-term coordination and cooperation constitute forms of collective agency, which will be discussed in the next section. Short-term coordination may be achieved through any of the ways of power exercise described above. Short-term cooperation has been a subject of game theory, which is discussed below. In bargaining, each party attempts to influence the behavior of the other by coercion, inducements, manipulation, or social influence. Offers are made and concessions are exchanged. The outcome may consist of the fulfilment of the intentions of both parties, a compromise, an exchange, or behavior different from the intention of either party. Exploitation implies an imbalance of exchange between groups. In competition, a contest of actors through exercises of power may end with the attainment of control by one party, by a compromise, or by an exchange. Exchange rates may be fixed by the elimination of others;

influencing others' decisions; adaptation to others' decisions; or agreement among the actors. Motivational investment in goals mediated by the other may be reduced by cultivating alternative sources of gratification. An increase in the value of goals mediated by the subject may be effected. And the subject may cut off alternative sources for achieving such goals by forming coalitions (Hobbes, [1651] 1996; Olsen, 1970; Rothschild, 1971; Morgan, 1986; Scott, 1994, 2001; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Tilly and Tilly, 1994; Rasmusen, 2001). According to Weber (1972 [1922]), actors compete on markets for exchange opportunities through a struggle over prices, ending in compromises resulting from power-constellations. Buyers or sellers may also choose quantities, while allowing prices to vary, or vice versa (Rasmusen, 2001).

In a classic study of strategy and conflict recently reinvigorated by McNeilly (1996), Tzu ([6th Cent. BC] 1988) argued that an actor can incite others to action to find out their organization, patterns of behavior, strengths, and weaknesses, to confuse them, tire them, or make them careless. Others may also be discouraged from action or forced to adopt particular organizational forms. They may be divided, harmed, or manipulated, and their subjects may be won over. Contacts with opponents may be reduced to minimize information leaks. Power may be exercised when and where opponents are vulnerable, aiming at quick success. In defense, actors may prevent internal divisions, assure sufficient resources, and exercise countervailing power. If opponents are too strong, actors may retreat. Effective leadership is required, and best is to win without fighting (Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; McMillan, 1989; Poggi, 2001). Olsen's (1970) 'power and conflict' approach to attain power consists of five stages: organization, power exertion, confrontation, social change, and attitude change. By means of organization, resources are brought together. Through power exertion, pressure is applied at vulnerable points of actors in critical positions, and tensions and conflicts are created. In confrontation, such actors agree to negotiate to solve threatening conflicts. Out of this process of negotiation and bargaining, through compromises, agreements may arise that produce social change. This may take the form of policies, rules, or practices. The final state is desired attitude change. Scott (2001) discusses counteraction, or coordinated or collective action against a powerholder through pressure or protest. Pressure is applied when counteracting groups are recognized by the powerholder; protest is expressed by groups that are not part of the structure of established power. Pressure is exercised through lobbying, negotiation, and discussion, while protest is expressed through coercion and inducement.

In competition or conflict, a more powerful actor tends to prevail over a less powerful one. But a highly motivated actor with less power may prevail over a more powerful, but

unmotivated other. When a powerful actor mobilizes limited resources and loses to a less powerful but more mobilized actor, this may lead to greater mobilization by the powerful actor and, in the long run, to victory. But when there are only a few rounds and the outcome is irreversible, the less powerful but highly mobilized actor may prevail (Etzioni, [1968] 1970; Goldman, [1972] 1986; Hindess, [1982] 1994). When an organization is taken over after a power struggle, a new powerholder may leave the organization intact, or reform and modernize it. Power may be exercised to stay in power. The powerholder may strengthen his or her power basis, while diminishing the power bases of others (Tzu, [6th Cent. BC] 1988; Machiavelli, [1513] 1981; Lenski, [1966] 1986). While a powerholder can exert pressure on subjects to adopt policies, subjects can do the same to the powerholder, or they can resist. Revolution may occur unless reactions to the exercise of power are anticipated (Nisbet, [1953] 1970; Simon, [1953] 1994; Harsanyi, [1962] 1971).

Game theory discusses complexes of situations, strategies, and interactions. Over the past sixty years or so, mainstream game theory has described and analyzed many games. The famous prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) describes a situation in which it does not pay for an actor to cooperate with others where it is rational from the perspective of self-enhancement for others to defect. In an infinitely repeated PDG, actors know that a competitive move can lead to retaliation. In effect, it may be in their interest to cooperate. Other games described by Rasmusen (2001) include the game of chicken, the trucking game, ranked and dangerous coordination, the battle of the sexes, welfare, pre-emption, contribution, civic duty, and auditing games, entry deterrence, the nuisance suit model, the follow-the-leader game, and the noisy and silent duels. In repeated games, actors may use different strategies such as the grim strategy; the tit-for-tat strategy; the minimax strategy; and the maximin strategy (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Rasmusen, 2001).

Mainstream game theory deserves credit for framing the way in which actors pursue their interests in situations with interdependent choices. However, mainstream game theoretical models do not tend to survive empirical testing (Roth, 1996; Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998). In reality, the reason why an actor did something depends on that actor's personal characteristics, which are much more complex than is allowed for in mainstream game theory (Kahneman, 2003). In addition, in applications it has been shown to be difficult to specify exactly what game is being played (Roth, 1991). The latter point is crucial, because if the aim is to *understand* a social phenomenon rather than predict it, the starting point of the analysis is knowledge of that phenomenon followed by an attempt at explanation going back in time.

Thus, in terms of the focus of game theory, understanding starts by determining what actors did, and then explaining why they did it.

These problems have been tackled in experimental economics, which applies laboratory methods of inquiry to the study of interaction. Both external rules and internal rules such as norms, traditions, and habits are taken into account, as well as other-regarding preferences, changes in preferences, incomplete information, risk-aversion, attention, thinking, learning, and teaching processes, intentions, group processes, the environment - including 'framing' - and unintended effects (Roth, 1991; Kagel and Roth, 1995; Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Smith, 2002; Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2003; Kahneman, 2003). For example, in PDGs, it has been found that actors will in fact cooperate if they have a tendency to trust others. Cooperation is also increased by the invocation of feelings of fair play. Trust in another actor's intention has also been shown to enhance reciprocal exchange with a time-lag (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2001, in press).

Taking into account the psychological characteristics of actors is in line with the view I have taken on personal agency. But it does create a problem which has been somewhat characteristic of social psychology, namely, how to arrive at a systematic body of theories, analyses, and research out of the complexity of the interplay between psychological characteristics and interaction. Again, individual, historical, and social specificity seems important here. Another, more serious problem for experimental economics concerns the translation of findings from laboratory research into application in life outside the laboratory (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). This means that it might be best to be somewhat cautious in applying findings from experimental economics in the analysis of social life. Finally, similarly to mainstream game theory, and characteristic of much of psychology, experimental economics does not provide tools to analyze situations in any convincing way; instead, situations are mostly taken for granted.

A combination of Fligstein's approach based on fields and types of interaction together with insights from experimental economics (with due attention to individual, historical, and social specificity) seems a promising approach to take to the analysis of situations, fields, strategies, and interactions - especially if enriched with other ideas dealing with these issues, some of which I have described in this section. The literature on industrial organization and marketing would seem to have much to offer as well. In addition, powerstructures, ways of power exercise, and power effects are important. What is missing still is an analysis of collective agency.

6. Collective Agency (in Organizations)

Collective agency entails the ability to perform collective activities and achieve common goals by means of collective power exertion. Power can be exercised by organizations or groups - including networks and coalitions (Olsen, 1970). In order to perform collective activities and achieve common goals, some type of management is required - whether or not top-down. In my view, human resource management (HRM) - in the broad sense of the management of people by people in an organization, group, or network (Strauss, 2001) - is the central factor in any type of collective agency, even if most of the HRM literature deals with organizations. As a full discussion of HRM falls outside the scope of this paper, my discussion will by necessity be somewhat sketchy. Elements of HRM fall into six categories: work flow, human resource flow, compensation, governance, industrial relations, and the labor force. An encompassing category of HRM systems captures combinations of HRM practices from the six categories. In terms of other collective agents, such as states, voluntary associations, social movements, and other groups or networks, these categories could have been labelled activity flow, the flow of members or citizens, (intrinsic) rewards, governance, class relations, membership, and management systems - or something similar. Just like organizations, other collective agents have an implicit or explicit structuring of activities, a flow of members, forms of rewards, and so on. I will use the original organizational terminology here, in order not to lose the connection to the relevant literature. Of course, adjustments will need to be made if the HRM literature is to be used in the analysis of other collective agents than organizations (especially in the discussion of shareholders). In addition, an emphasis will come to lie on a specific part of HRM; thus, for instance, the informal organization is important in forms of collective action. Nonetheless, it seems to me that many general insights into collective agency can be derived from the HRM literature. The discussion below is to a large extent based on broad studies of HRM, including Beer *et al.* (1984), Morgan (1986), March and Simon (1993), Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth (1996), Marsden (1999), and Gómez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy (2001). A collective actor is set up when a personal agent successfully instigates HRM for whichever reason. When collective actors already exist, their continuing operation is the result of HRM.

6.1. Work Flow

The category of work flow is concerned with the way in which tasks are organized in collective agents. Tasks may be organized through formal and/or informal organization.

6.1.1. Formal Organization

Mintzberg (1983) uses the term formal structure to refer to the documented, official relationship among members of an organization. He distinguishes several parts: operating core, strategic apex, middle line, technostructure, support staff, and liaison contacts. Positions may be grouped into functional or market units. Organizations may be centralized or decentralized. Jobs may be task- or function-based according to productive tasks or qualifications; they may be specialized or complex; supervised or autonomous; individual or team-based; and they may have detailed or general descriptions. They may be adjusted through work simplification, or job enlargement, rotation, or enrichment. Jobs may be organized into workgroups, QCCs, or self-managed, problem-solving, special purpose, or virtual teams (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Together, the parts of an organization constitute a structural configuration. Mintzberg (1983) distinguishes the simple structure; the machine bureaucracy; the professional bureaucracy; the divisionalized form; the adhocracy; and the missionary configuration. Dore (1973) and Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) describe the welfare corporatist structure. Other configurations include the flat organization; the enterprising organization; network-based organizations; the boundaryless structure; and virtual organizations. The formal structure is influenced by the size and age of the organization (Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998). Constraints to structural change include investments in trained personnel, constraints on information flows, the internal and external political situation and social support, legal and fiscal barriers, and tradition (Robinson, 1994). Voluntary restructuring has been found to occur when there is proof of the need for change, opportunity for improvement, consensus among top management, and a mandate for change (Donaldson, [1994] 1997).

6.1.2. Informal Organization

Barnard ([1938] 1968) defines the informal organization as an aggregate of personal contacts and interactions and the associated groupings of people. Groups may be formed on the basis of self-interested or cooperative goal achievement, or as a result of self-categorization in terms of social identity (Turner and Oakes, 1989; DiMaggio, 1994; Levine,

1995; Poggi, 2001; Scott, 2001). For groups, the achievement of organization, leadership, common goals, and solidarity is necessary to establish a powerbasis. Certain members are essential for a group's continuity. If these 'identifiers' leave, the group ceases to exist (Pizzorno, 1986; Wrong, 1994). Conflict is a pervasive aspect of both group and inter-group life. But groups are often at the same time dependent on each other. In result, they may resolve their conflicting preferences through negotiation and compromise (Selznick, 1957; Levine, 1989).

Informal relations may also exist in the form of networks - loosely joined sets of individuals, groups, or organizations (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck, 1994). In networks, common strategies are pursued, risks are shared, behavior is imitated, and attitudes tend to be similar. Networks support the spread of structures, practices, and innovations (Cook, [1977] 1994; Scott, 1991; Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992; Nohria and Gulati, 1994; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Child, 1997). Networks are kept together by trust, value consensus, resource dependency, or through dominant units imposing dependence or discipline on others. They can disintegrate if members are pulled out, or through conflicts (Mills, [1956] 1970; Sako and Helper, 1995; Ferlie and Pettigrew, [1996] 1998).

An informal organization may sustain a formal organization, but it may also undermine the latter. A dominant coalition may control important areas of policy, but the loyalties and commitment of participants to groups and networks, the plurality of goals, and the diversity of habits, perceptions, and identities also make conflict a normal feature of organizational life. The protection of identity may lead people to seek independence from an organization, thereby denying themselves participation (Selznick, 1957; Knights and Wilmott, [1985] 1994; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Martinelli, 1994; Paauwe, 1998).

6.2. Human Resource Flow

Human resource flow includes staffing, career development, and training. It may be based on recruiting the best individuals for the job, or providing career development and training. It is influenced by business objectives and plans, stakeholder interests, and the environment.

6.2.1. Staffing

Staffing entails bringing persons into a cooperative relationship with the collective agent, and eliciting their services. It includes determining the size and composition of membership (Barnard, [1938] 1968; McMillan, 1989). Beer *et al.* (1984) make a distinction between the lifetime, up-or-out, and in-and-out systems. In practice, these systems may be mixed. Work may be organized on a regular or flexible basis - as in contingent work (Brewster, Hegewisch, and Mayne, 1994). Hiring includes internal or external recruitment and selection on the basis of required characteristics. The ability to attract and keep members depends on organizational and government policies and labor market conditions. Employment contracts regulate tasks, level of effort, working conditions, and form, frequency, and amount of payment. They may be detailed or rely upon diffuse cooperation, negotiated individually or collectively, and subject to regulation. Subsequent to hiring, organizations may use a probationary period to determine whether or not a new recruit will be retained (Tilly and Tilly, 1994; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998).

Members may be dismissed, usually on the basis of seniority or performance. This reduces costs, while the fear of dismissal may create incentives for effort. But dismissals can affect loyalty, commitment, trust, and productivity of remaining members, and hamper recruitment. Legislation, social pressures, or collective bargaining agreements may impede dismissals. Alternative policies may be used, such as early retirement incentives, buyouts, hiring freezes, cuts in work hours or contingent work, transfers, pay cuts, and work expansion. Members may quit or retire. An increase in turnover may lead to a decrease in commitment and training investments. But low turnover may curtail promotion opportunities and innovation, while members may become complacent (Sørensen, 1994; Ichniowski *et al.*, 2000; Pudelko, 2000).

6.2.2. Career Development

Career development aims at meeting skill requirements and career needs. It helps to recruit and retain a skilled and committed workforce. It may or may not be centralized, as individuals can be provided with control over their careers. Career paths may encourage functional specialization or cross-functional mobility. Candidates may compete for promotion on the basis of performance or seniority. Seniority supports training, but may imply that less qualified people are promoted. Informal activities such as networking, mentoring, participation in committees, and membership in professional organizations may support a career. For top executives, prerequisites for promotion include decision-making ability in the

organization, but also demonstrated leadership outside it, and adherence to rules of dress and conduct. Slow careers reduce motivation, and may lead to litigation and questions of fairness. Fast careers increase satisfaction and commitment, but may result in individuals progressing faster than their capacity, leading to failure and loss of investment. When expectations are not met, dissatisfaction, poor performance, turnover, legal action, or union activities may result (Pellegrin and Coates, [1956] 1994; Martinelli, 1994; Sørensen, 1994).

6.2.3. Training

Training activities aim to meet skill requirements, increase motivation, commitment, performance, and retention, and help employees realize their potential. Training can be provided to individuals or teams, on the basis of individual need or to all those who qualify, on-the-job or off-the-job. It may be aimed at the short- or long-run. Job specific training enhances the dependence of members on the organization, while general training makes them multi-deployable. Types of training include initial vocational training, skills training, retraining, cross-functional, team, creativity, and service training. Executive development programs may be used for teaching managerial skills or knowledge. Wealthy, large, complex organizations and those with internal labor markets provide much training. Organizations also provide a lot of training when skilled workers are hard to hire, technological advances are rapid, and competition is strong. Training may be affected by capital market pressures, legal regulations, and societal conventions. Employer associations may monitor training quality and help to restrain free-riding on costs. Union demands may stimulate training (Mintzberg, 1983; Crouch, 1993; Larsen, 1994; Huselid, [1995] 1998; Müller, 1998; Pudelko, 2000).

6.3. Compensation

Compensation achieves motivation and satisfaction and assures the availability of labor. It consists of fixed regular pay, variable compensation, benefits, and non-financial rewards. Regular pay is often determined through job evaluation. Compensable factors include working conditions, knowledge and skills, responsibility, and importance of results. Benchmark jobs and salary surveys may be used to link jobs to regular pay provided by others. Regular pay may also be influenced by seniority, experience, performance, historical wage patterns, the willingness to pay, internal organizational politics, unions, the expectations of workers, and legislation. Variable compensation may use performance related pay (PRP)

on the basis of individual, group, plant, or organization-wide performance. Individual and collective PRP can be used simultaneously, to communicate that both individual performance and cooperation are important. Apart from possible benefits, such as health insurance, pensions, and child care, members also receive nonfinancial rewards, such as job responsibilities, security, promotion, and recognition (Sørensen, 1994; Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998).

There is a tension between perceived fairness of compensation within the organization, and perceived fairness of compensation relative to other organizations. Internal inequity can result in conflict, while equity can result in over- and underpaying people compared to other organizations. This may result in an inability to attract and keep members. An organization may pay efficiency wages to facilitate recruitment, but this may decrease competitiveness. Compensation increases with size, internal labor markets, market power, capital intensity, impact of workers on aggregate performance, proximity to high-impact workers, tight labor markets, the presence of unions or professional organizations, and government regulation. Managers and professionals are the highest paid members. Contingent workers receive less than core workers (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Sørensen, 1994; Tilly and Tilly, 1994).

Pay decisions may be centralized or delegated to unit managers, supervisors, or work teams. Participation of employees may increase acceptance. Managers may fix their own compensation, although they may be constrained by shareholders. Compensation of a unionized workforce is subject to negotiation and bargaining. Pay or pay ranges may be made public, or employees may be sworn to secrecy under penalty of termination. Differences often exist over compensation between employees and management. When employees can voice their frustration through an appeal mechanism, they are less likely to engage in conflict (Rothschild 1971; Miller, [1996] 1998).

6.4. Governance

Governance consists of social control, legitimation, and socialization.

6.4.1. Social Control

Social control in collective agents serves to create and maintain order among members. Efforts are made to preserve the formal and/or informal system against counterpressures and to combat resistance to the intentions of the dominant group. Social control also

serves to stimulate workers into effective production (Barnard, [1938] 1968; Packard, 1957; Selznick, 1957; Steers and Porter, 1991; Child 1997). Form and practices of a collective agent may persist by themselves because they are taken for granted. People also preserve structures to protect the power they derive from them. And a sense of commonness of purpose, interests, and character increases the propensity of members to defend each other against outside pressures (Selznick, 1957; O'Neill, [1987] 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).

In corporations, the authority of employers over employees rests on the ownership of assets. The owners who control an organization through their property rights may delegate the authority to run the business to managers (Veblen, [1904] 1958, [1923] 1994; Poggi, 2001). Conflicts of interest may arise between owners and managers. The former may want short-term economic gains, while the latter may be interested in reinvesting profit to enhance competitiveness. Shareholder meetings in principle serve to control management in the interest of shareholders. While large shareholders may be able to control management this way, most of the stock represented at shareholder meetings may be voted by proxy by directors selected by management. Ownership of equity may make managers more likely to think and act like shareholders, and stock options for managers create an incentive to maximize stock price. Legal provisions may provide control and information rights to shareholders, including the right to appoint managers and to vote on decisions. Hostile takeovers constitute another mechanism for monitoring and restructuring firms. The threat of a takeover increases shareholder value orientation with management, although managers have invented defensive strategies. A creditor may also have power over management, and provide instructions. Banks often have the ability to vote their stock. And institutional investors evaluate and influence the performance of managers through portfolio choices. In the end, organizational goals result from compromises within a dominant coalition, and between such a coalition and others (Rothschild, 1971; Kamoche, [1994] 1998; Martinelli, 1994, Mizruchi and Brewster Stearns, 1994; Chew, 1997; Höpner, 2001; Scott, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2002).

Management has the right to organize work, hire, promote, compensate, direct, discipline, demote, and dismiss employees, limited by employee rights and union labor contracts (Pen, [1966] 1971; Nohria and Gulati, 1994). The power of managers may be based on charismatic, traditional, and/or rational-legal authority. Experts have power when high-ranking persons in the organization are dependent on them. Lower participants may also wield power, based on the dependence of others, expertise, seniority, and centrality of position. In addition, coalitions may form among lower participants. The power of a subunit depends on

its strategical importance; the status accruing to its functions; informal relations to top management; and the intelligence, skills, and personalities of personnel. The more central a person in an organization, the greater may be that person's power. An actor's power always depends on others, and no person controls all activities. Overall, a dominant coalition in an organization has the power to institute rules, procedures, and information systems that limit the potential power of others (Olsen, 1970; Scott, 1994, 2001).

Formal organization can be used to achieve control and coordination over activities through the designation of relationships, positions, roles, resources, rules, authority, incentive and information systems, activities, and technology. This includes the extent of centralization. An administrative staff may be used for maintaining compliance (Weber, [1922] 1972; Dubin, [1963] 1970; Robinson, 1994; Scott, 1994; Tempel, 2001). Direct supervision implies making a single supervisor responsible for a set of subordinates. The supervisor is in turn subordinate to someone at the next level. Alternatives include the delegation of decision-making; standardization of work processes, work outputs, or worker skills; and mutual adjustment. Work outputs may be standardized by action planning, performance control, or a combination of both. It includes the development of action programs, management information systems, and possibly management by objectives. Mutual adjustment achieves coordination by informal communication through meetings, liaison positions, or matrix structure (Mintzberg, 1983). Tall hierarchies are characterized by the decentralization of decision making. When they have narrow supervisory spans, they separate individuals from their class or occupational affiliations. They raise dependence by increasing the proportion of employees with management responsibilities. Moreover, they hold out the promise of career advancement. Flat hierarchies make it easier to talk to top management. Employees assume more obligations (Olsen, 1970; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Nohria and Gulati, 1994; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). Whereas top managers have great discretion, other workers often have circumscribed jobs. Formal job descriptions enable higher management to control first line management. They may also be used by workers to protect themselves against intensification. Unskilled operators may try to have their jobs labeled 'professional' to increase their status and reduce controls. Job enlargement and enrichment have been introduced to diminish worker alienation and increase productivity. Jobs may also be designed to maximize the non-transferable component of worker skills (Mintzberg, 1983). Within teams, leadership is subject to negotiation. Authority is based on position as well as wisdom or competence. Feelings of obligation play an important role (Ferlie and Pettigrew, [1996] 1998).

Social control may also take place through informal organization. The power of a group depends on its size and the characteristics of its members, their positions, relations, and cohesiveness. Commitments or obligations may be mobilized for collective action. Decision-making in groups may be based on plurality vote, majority vote, or unanimity. It is influenced by the backgrounds of participants; customs; the pressures brought to bear; and group remembering processes. While group decision-making may lead to outcomes more in line with ideas of rationality than individual decision-making, when groups become isolated, 'groupthink' may arise - in which strivings for unanimity override the motivation to realistically appraise alternatives. Group discussion may make like-minded people's attitudes more extreme as people seek to conform to what defines their group (Wilson and Lupton, [1959] 1971; Lenski, [1966] 1970; Lukes, 1986; Paulus, 1989; Scott, 1994; Kristiansen and Zanna, 1994; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Simon, 1995; Munroe and Munroe, 1997; Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998). Groups may be assembled and cooperation may be induced by leaders, who control resources. Leadership may be based on skills in the exercise of power and in negotiation. Other requirements may include trustworthiness, loyalty, humaneness, courage, truthfulness, sternness, and adaptability. Groups may cooperate or compete with other groups, and coalitions may be formed or dissolved. Superordinate goals may transform hostile intergroup relations into cooperative ones (Tzu, [6th Cent. BC] 1988; Olsen, 1970; Lukes, 1986; Scott, 1994; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Child, 1997; Fligstein, 1997b). Networks may also shape the actions of participants. They may generate trust and expose individuals to information. Sources of power in networks include centrality; the size of an actor's set of ties; access to actors in strategic locations; and available resources. Interlocking directorships may constitute powerful networks (Granovetter, [1985] 1992; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Scott, 1994, 2001; Ferlie and Pettigrew, [1996] 1998).

In social control through human resource flow, internal labor markets may fragment the workforce and thwart union organizing drives. By enticing employees to seek jobs that are differentially graded in pay and status, the organization induces individual striving for upward mobility at the expense of solidarity. Interests are tied to the success of the organization, leading to compliance. Promotion by seniority precludes arbitrary decisions by managers. Work can also be controlled by hiring professionals, but this surrenders control over work methods to outside institutions that train and certify such professionals. Control may be achieved through training as well as through deskilling (Mintzberg, 1983; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Newton and Findlay, [1996] 1998).

Force and coercion can be used to secure or exclude the contribution of individuals. It may create fear among others, making them more disposed to render contributions. Coercion may take place through withholding resources, as in threats of plant closing, or through public humiliation of employees. Workers may be told how to work and how hard (Barnard, [1938] 1968; Selznick, 1957; Knights and Roberts, [1982] 1994; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Ahrne, 1994). Employee behavior may be controlled through discipline, which entails the communication of unacceptable behavior along with threats of sanctions if behavior does not change. Rules and procedures may define acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Discipline is usually performed by supervisors, but in self-managed teams it may be a team responsibility (Veblen, [1904] 1958; Bierstedt, [1950] 1970; Nohria and Gulati, 1994). Other forms of coercion include group norms encouraging or discouraging performance; the use of technology; building design; and goal-setting (McMillan, 1989; Miller and Rose, [1993] 1998; Tilly and Tilly, 1994; Ichniowski *et al.*, 2000). Coercive action may backlash as countercoercive union organization may emerge (Knights and Roberts, [1982] 1994).

Incentives may be offered to secure desired behaviors. These may be material - such as money or things; or non-material - such as recognition, power, self-realization, and security. Intrinsic rewards include feelings of accomplishment and being valuable to others. Incentive systems - including promotion, training, and compensation - may link a reward to output, actions, capabilities, or seniority. Employees may be motivated to achieve independently and/or to cooperate. Task identity and significance and the need for a variety of skills may make work meaningful to individuals. Through participation and autonomy, they may feel responsible for results, and through feedback, they may learn about results. This may lead to higher motivation, quality, and satisfaction, and lower absenteeism and turnover. People may try hard if their efforts are consistently linked to outcomes they value, and if they feel their rewards are reasonable in comparison to others. The problem with using external incentives is that they may weaken intrinsic motivation, loyalty, and commitment. Individuals may also feel that the rewards they receive are uncorrelated with their productivity. In addition, workers may concentrate solely on those activities whose outcome can be accounted to them (Parsons and Smelser, 1956; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Scott, 1991; Sørensen, 1994; Pudelko, 2000).

Coercion and inducement may be combined, and other forms of manipulation may be used. Opportunities may be restricted or expanded, and agenda control may influence decisions. Theater - including physical settings and appearances - can add to an individual's power. The formal organization can be adapted to redistribute or isolate recalcitrant elements.

Collective manipulation of effort can be reduced by promoting individuals, and new groups committed to policies may be created. Movements towards industrial democracy may divert or diffuse potential opposition (Selznick, 1957; Sørensen, 1994; Hui and Luk, 1997). Physical segregation may introduce divisions in the workforce. Units may be stimulated to have their own rules and procedures, cultivate their own departmental culture, and compete with each other (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Authority can be used to enhance motivation. This is facilitated by hierarchy and legal rights. But supervision based on authority may be experienced as alienating, leading to minimum acceptable effort (Goldman, [1972] 1986; Sørensen, 1994).

Decision-making in collective agents may be top-down, but decision-making authority may also be delegated. Participation may occur, either through representatives or directly. It may consist of the expression of interests, or actual influence on policies. The goal of participation is to create a coincidence of interests between managers and lower-level members, thereby increasing trust and mutual influence, and reducing conflict. Involvement may lead to increases in motivation, effort, performance, commitment, loyalty, and satisfaction. Participation may confirm the identity of a participant and result in recognition. Direct participation may serve to limit the influence, or prevent the development, of representative participation. Reversely, direct participation may be prevented by bodies of representative participation. The scope of an influence policy depends on the values and convictions of managers, the desires and abilities of members and unions, and the aims of informal leaders (Pizzorno, 1986; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Denison, 1991; Brewster, Hegewisch, Mayne, and Tregaskis, 1994; Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998; Ichniowski *et al.*, 2000; Pudelko, 2000; Tempel, 2001).

According to Paterson, the decision-making process consists of a number of steps: information collection; information processing; making the decision; authorization; and execution. Power is thought to depend on control over these steps, and decisions taken are seen to reflect such power (Mintzberg, 1983; Salancik and Pfeffer, [1977] 1994). A decision is arrived at through initiation, bargaining, and persuasion, involving compromise, concession, exchange, and veto power (Kamoche, [1994] 1998). According to March and Simon (1993), decision-making tends to be based on simple rules of thumb and limited search and information, although a means-end analysis may be pursued. Organizations do not search for or consider alternatives to the present course of action unless that present course is unsatisfactory. In the search for action programs, variables that are within control are considered first. If a satisfactory program is not discovered, attention is turned to other

variables. If a satisfactory program is still not found, an effort is made to relax criteria. Decision making influences the environment, while reversely, limitations to structure and agency arise from the environment. Action is bound by the material, relational, and cognitive structures existing within organizations, groups, and networks. At the same time, action impacts upon those structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Child, 1997; Scott, 2001).

Outcomes, qualifications, competence, behavior, and traits may be monitored and assessed. Societal factors influence the criteria used as a result of trust, familiarity, and collective agreements or conventions. Assessment may be performed by supervisors, but members may also rate themselves or their supervisors. In management by objectives (MBO), workers and their supervisors set outcome goals together for the upcoming period, with assessment at the end of the period. Appraisal may be in absolute terms on the basis of industry or professional standards, or relative to the performance of other members. It may or may not be standardized, formal, regular, and the same for all. Using objective measures may focus workers' attention exclusively on certain outcomes, for which they may set low standards. Appraisal may form the basis for selection, promotion, training, compensation, discipline, and termination. It may be used to help employees improve their performance and skills, or to terminate low producers. It allows management to communicate objectives to members. Appraisal makes performance visible and members accountable. Members receive feedback - allowing for improvement in performance and a sense of fairness with regard to the effect of performance on outcomes. Appraisal may contribute to the reduction or diffusion of vertical conflict (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Beechler and Bird, 1994; Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998; Pudelko, 2000; Miyamoto and Kubo, 2002).

Communication allows for the transmission of directions and information, and it creates conduits for socialization and the transfer of practices. Organizations may rely on top-down communication, but they may also encourage bottom-up feedback. The control of data and the use of surveys make it possible to govern (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Miller and Rose, [1993] 1998; Robinson, 1994; Pudelko, 2000).

A control system consists of a combination of control techniques. In the bureaucratic control system, control is built into job categories, descriptions, and responsibilities; work rules; promotion and discipline procedures; training; wage scales; performance programs; and formal appraisals. The bureaucratic control system has a formal system of incentives for appropriate behavior and penalties for inappropriate behavior. Procedures and records are used to limit discretion and monitor activities. Decisions may to some extent be delegated. The epitome of bureaucratic control is 'scientific management' - or 'Taylorism' - which has

been considered one of the main forces creating industrial unrest. In response, it was adjusted to accommodate unionism, collective bargaining, and paternalistic and welfare concessions to labor (Mintzberg, 1983; Robinson, 1994; Scott, 1994). In corporatist control systems, autonomy, participation, careers, and intrinsic rewards such as challenging and meaningful tasks and a cohesive community, foster motivation, loyalty, and commitment. Finely graded job and status hierarchies together with a proliferation of units and teams fragment workers as a class while encouraging vertical contacts and dependency. Formal rules safeguard employee rights while legitimating obligations. Paternalism breeds worker dependence (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). An enterprising system involves cultivating autonomous, productive, self-actualizing, and responsible individuals. Involvement results from training employees to take on supervisory roles. Competition is encouraged through small group working, while individual responsibility is elicited through peer-review and appraisal schemes. Efficiency, quality, service, innovativeness, result-sharing, and participation are emphasized. Quality control circles and communication groups are used (Du Gay and Salaman, [1992] 1998).

Compliance to social control may be the effect of loyalty, rational calculus, indifference, or a lack of alternatives (Donaldson, [1994] 1997; Scott, 1994; Tilly and Tilly, 1994; Newton and Findlay, [1996] 1998). Effective control is limited by the rights and abilities of members, uncertainties, the complexities of balancing trade-offs across time and space, competition, and the legal framework. Lower-level managers, units, and employees may have countervailing power. Lower level members may participate in or leave the organization; they may produce or refuse to produce. They may control access to persons, information, and instrumentalities, and deceive superiors. Countervailing coalitions may be built. Employees may establish unions or professional groups. A lack of effective social control may lead to unproductive behavior or conflicts. Members may leave (Mechanic, [1962] 1994; Mintzberg, 1983; Pizzorno, 1986; Strauss, 2001; Tempel, 2001).

Contradictions and conflicts are important organizational phenomena. People must collaborate in pursuit of a common task, yet are often pitted against each other in competition for resources, status, and career advancement (Selznick, 1957). Defining and enforcing the employment contract is a source of potential conflict, as is a reward system that places individuals or groups in competition. And when employees are unhappy about appraisal, they may confront their employer (Newton and Findlay, [1996] 1998). Workers may refuse to undertake certain tasks, or they may seek to improve their job prospects by encroaching on the tasks of others. This can generate conflict between groups of workers. Envy may lead people to block the success of their colleagues. Attempts to change technology may also

create conflicts between managers and employees and between different groups. Insufficient overall performance may lead to a crisis, leading to a change in the dominant coalition (Child, 1997). Conflicts can be resolved through accommodation, avoidance, the budget, formal dispute resolution procedures, manipulation, participation, problem solving, negotiation, bargaining, and compromise, legitimation, persuasion, collaboration, and competition. Organizational scapegoats may relieve tensions. Other organizations may be used as expert examples (Packard, 1957; Martinelli, 1994; Robinson, 1994).

Overall, superior-subordinate relations may be formal or personal (McMillan, 1989; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). To some extent, managers and workers are mutually dependent because of the costs of finding another job or of recruiting other workers. As a result, they have to tolerate margins in cooperation. Still, discontented members of an organization may resort to exit, depending on the number of alternatives (Pizzorno, 1986; Poggi, 2001). The organization may disappear through disorganization (Faris, [1948] 1964).

6.4.2. Legitimation

Legitimation in collective agents serves to increase authority which contributes to governance. Managers may choose a structure and strategies from existing models of organization that have rhetorical legitimacy. Often legitimacy is secured by adopting structures similar to those of apparently successful firms. In other cases, conceptions may be adopted that academics, consultants, the business media, or prominent business leaders claim to be progressive. Policies, programs, professions, products, and technologies may function as myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially. Many myths have official legitimacy based on governmental endorsements or requirements and legal mandates. By making the formal structure adhere to the prescriptions of myths, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes. The organization becomes legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its support and secure its survival. It becomes easier to conduct exchanges, to attract personnel, to maintain a good reputation, and to be eligible for contracts and grants. The myths of formal structure may have legitimacy based on the supposition that they are rationally effective. Purposes are identified as technical and appropriate means to pursue these purposes rationally are specified. Technical procedures of production, accounting, personnel selection, or data processing become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational ends. The emphasis on rationality aims to bind the organization together (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Nohria and Gulati, 1994). By adopting

forms which signal legitimacy in terms of dominant cultural values, organizations also secure compliance and commitment from employees socialized in those values (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Overall, organizations are concerned both with performing tasks efficiently and with legitimacy (Robinson, 1994).

Differences in compensation may be legitimated on the basis of equality, need, merit, achievement, effort, or the market. Internal labor markets legitimate inequality by stratifying individuals vertically via a hierarchy of positions with increasing levels of pay (Miller, [1996] 1998). High incomes of managers may be legitimated by referring to their productivity, experience, and knowledge (Pen, [1966] 1971). Power may be legitimated by pointing to formal rules, codes, procedures, technology, and expertise. Worker discipline, punishments, and rewards may be made to appear to flow from natural rules and procedures (O'Neill, [1987] 1994; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Ceremonial accounting procedures create legitimating production functions. When these are used, loans, donations, or investments are more easily obtained. Appraisal systems legitimate actions by demonstrating that human resources are deployed in a rational and efficient way. This is enhanced by the seeming fairness and objectivity of appraisal. Formal structures may be protected from evaluation by minimizing and ceremonializing inspection, evaluation, and control (Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991; Newton and Findlay, [1996] 1998).

Ideologies and theories of organization serve to support and legitimate authority. Unity in the organization can be created by espousing a unitary ideology. Strategic planning may be used as a metaphor to legitimize decisions and actions; the idea of rationality may be used to justify actions that suit specific interests; and the idea of egalitarianism may be established by eliminating distinctions between groups in dress, office space, parking, and eating facilities. A male uniform of shirt, suit, and tie projects a conservative philosophy that emphasizes conformity, whereas the lack of a uniform projects a philosophy of individuality, autonomy, and low dependence on superiors. Concern with the needs of employees has been justified by pointing to the favorable effect this has on productivity (Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998). In order to establish the authority of position, the filling of positions may be dramatized. By dignifying the superior position, all connection with the organization is dignified. The fiction that authority comes down from above supports the acceptability of orders from superiors. In order to exercise the authority of position, importance is ascribed to timing, place, dress, ceremony, and authentication of communications (Barnard, [1938] 1968). Leaders and/or the union may use models and symbols to indicate change. Innovative, isolated plants may be used as symbols of possibilities for others. A CEO, union leader, or plant manager - can

symbolize the change, articulating the desirable future and giving people faith in its realization (Beer *et al.*, 1984).

Technical activities, demands for efficiency, and attempts to control and coordinate activities may create conflicts and inconsistencies with ceremonial rules of production, leading to a loss of legitimacy. An organization can resolve such conflicts by decoupling structures from each other and from activities to maintain ceremonial conformity, together with maintaining the assumption that everyone is acting in good faith. Delegation, professionalization, goal ambiguity, elimination of output data and inspection, and the maintenance of face absorb uncertainty while preserving the formal structure (Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991). Nohria and Gulati (1994) find two rhetorical strategies for dealing with such trade-offs. The first is to describe an organization's structure and environment with the aim of leaving as many options open as possible. The other is to argue that trade-offs make constant reorganization a necessity.

6.4.3. Socialization

Through socialization based on social influence, an organization aims to shape the values, attitudes, norms, beliefs, practices, loyalties, and commitments of its participants. An attempt may be made to attain a congruence between organizational and individual characteristics, in the form of a corporate culture. Socialization may be implemented by managers according to a central, co-ordinated plan, using orientation and mentoring programs. A good deal of socialization also takes place informally (Barnard, [1938] 1968; Packard, 1957; Mintzberg, 1983; McMillan, 1989; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Miller and Rose, [1993] 1998; Nohria and Gulati, 1994; Simon, 1995; Crouch, 1996).

In general, socialization includes initiation, encapsulation, common training, and patronage. A harsh initiation may facilitate socialization, as it causes cognitive dissonance which can be reduced by placing a high value on membership. But a harsh initiation may also drive newcomers away. Encapsulation entails maximizing the time and energy newcomers devote to the group. Relations between newcomers and outsiders can be destructed through physical isolation and alterations in appearance, language, or customs. New relations can be created between newcomers and members through shared labor and the elimination of private property (Pizzorno, 1986; Paulus, 1989; DiMaggio, 1994; Wrong, 1994). Actions of subjects may lead to self-socialization through imitation, emulation, identification, play, role taking, or learning (Barnard, [1938] 1968; Camilleri and Malewska-Peyre, 1997).

Organizations may be constructed with unequal levels of privilege and opportunity. This reduces class consciousness in favor of occupational, professional, trade, or even factory loyalty. Organizational divisions erode employees' identities as workers and managers, and foster an attachment to a unit or functional area. Socialization may also occur through staffing and career development, as people come to recognize which qualities are valued. Internal labor markets may foster commitment (Selznick, 1957; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Much socialization occurs in initial training and apprenticeship programs, where job rotation may be used. Further training and management development programs reinforce initial socialization (Barnard [1938] 1968; Mintzberg, 1983; Robinson, 1994). Where compensation is oriented at individuals, identification with groups is weaker than where it is group-based. Generous benefits help to establish a loyal and stable workforce that is committed to the organization. Intrinsic rewards in jobs requiring high skill also foster favorable work attitudes. And collective success has been found to lead to higher commitment (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Sørensen, 1994).

Commitment may be fostered by threatening with plant closings and production outsourcing. Discipline may aim at changing the moral habits of workers, to make them orderly, punctual, responsible, and docile. Since this takes time, organizations may seek to minimize turnover and maximize loyalty. They may draw up a 'code of practices' to indicate what behavior they expect, while basing evaluation on attitudes to the corporation. Morale and group cohesion may also be improved by increasing participation. Participatory structures may aim to build community and loyalty. Group activities may draw workers into decision-making and diffuse responsibility, thus heightening feelings of participation and commitment. This may increase cohesion. 'Responsible autonomy' aims to harness commitment through the inducements of status, autonomy, control, and responsibility. Fair and consistent treatment, trust, and face-to-face encounters of managers and workers may also increase commitment. Lower-level managers may be deceived into believing they have influence on decisions. This may lead them to accept organizational interests (Selznick, 1957; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Scott, 1994; Newton and Findlay, [1996] 1998).

Values and beliefs may be influenced by propaganda. Images, symbols, stories, rituals, and language communicate ideologies, values, and beliefs guiding action. Ideologies can transmit meaning and achieve control (McMillan, 1989; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Mabey, Salaman, and Storey, 1998). Behavior may be infused with meaning and purpose through the elaboration of myths, philosophies, or missions. This boosts morale through providing purpose and meaning, and communicates the bases for decisions. Organizational goals define

a collective purpose with which participants can identify. Business strategies can influence attitudes, commitment, and the type of people present in the organization (Selznick, 1957; Denison, 1991; Nohria and Gulati, 1994). Solidarity may be reinforced by rituals, symbols, and repeated interaction. Employees may be brought together in social events or for speeches by top managers (Mintzberg, 1983; Pizzorno, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Incentives may be rationalized by indicating the satisfaction they supply. Motivations may also be conditioned through examples and suggestions (Barnard, [1938] 1968).

In corporatist organizations, tall, finely-graded hierarchies raise commitment by increasing the proportion of employees with management responsibilities. Promotion possibilities imply anticipatory socialization. Employees are socialized through symbols, rituals, ceremonies, social activities, and training. Company newspapers, songs, pep talks, and calisthenics reinforce shared interests and values (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). In enterprising organizations, the management of meanings, beliefs, and values intends to remove the contradiction between central control and autonomy. Here, socialization entails the harnessing of the strivings of individuals for autonomy and creativity. Enterprising qualities - such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, boldness, a willingness to take risks in the pursuit of goals, energy, initiative, and calculation - are promoted. People are encouraged to believe that their contribution is vital to the success of the organization as well as to their own. Employees are provided with a mission and with job satisfaction. Business success and personal growth are brought into alignment (Du Gay and Salaman, [1992] 1998).

Socialization supports decentralization. Commitment may increase legitimacy and the ability to control and socialize. Committed workers are more likely to stay with the organization, thereby ensuring a return on investment in staffing, career development, and training. Absenteeism may be lower and motivation may be higher. Increased commitment can also result in feelings of self-worth. Mutual trust makes communication more believable and management more responsive to employee's concerns. While homogeneity is an aid to communication, it also binds the organization to aims and procedures, limiting the freedom of leadership. Limits to socialization include the resistance to changes in values acquired early in life, and commitment to conflicting entities (Tzu, [6th Cent. BC] 1988; Selznick, 1957; Hofstede, 1991; Robinson, 1994; Scott, 1994; Guest, [1995] 1998).

6.5. Industrial Relations

The HRM category of industrial relations refers to the relations between associations of management and employees within an organization. Employers may combine efforts in associations that operate to promote common interests. One aim of employers associations is to control wage costs (Sisson and Marginson, 2002). Workers may draw together in unions to do their bargaining with firms collectively. The union represents employees' interests on issues such as compensation, staffing, working conditions, and managerial authority. Unions may represent employees from a single or from multiple employers (Parsons and Smelser, 1956). The power of associations depends on their comprehensiveness and density of membership; wealth; articulation; cohesiveness; capacity for self-discipline; the law; the level of unemployment; and the political situation (Riesman, [1951] 1970; Rothschild, 1971; Crouch, 1993b; Van Waarden, 1995). According to Galbraith ([1952] 1970), strong unions exist in industries with strong corporations. Elsewhere unions are weaker or less comprehensive.

Unions can change policies, rules, and practices. Unionized firms tend to pay higher wages and better benefits. A higher employee retention rate lowers hiring costs and provides an incentive for investments in training. Promotion based on seniority discourages resistance to training, but often places less qualified workers in higher-level jobs, reducing productivity. The presence of unions supports participation, equality, and innovation. Union 'threat effects' may motivate nonunionized organizations to provide their employees with higher rewards to avoid unionization. Unions also influence practices of non-unionized firms through their political influence (Beer *et al.*, 1984; Gómez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy, 2001).

Under a union acceptance strategy, the union is seen as a legitimate representative and collective bargaining is accepted. In the union substitution approach, management removes the incentive for unionization by being responsive to employees' needs. The union suppression approach is used when management wants to avoid unionization at all costs. Companies may prefer a nonunion workforce, because this allows them discretion and flexibility, and because of lower wages. Union power may be diminished by: decentralization of plants; legal restraints on the use of labor power; use of the police, strike breakers, and espionage; the mobilization of middle and professional classes into federations; attacks on opposition leadership; encouragement of fear of outsiders to emphasize organizational loyalty; and programs and propaganda for women, children, and the aged. Employers may use contingent workers, which are difficult to organize for unions. Overall, industrial relations can be collaborative or adversarial. A collaborative relation may be reflected in flexibility, few industrial disputes, and employee commitment. The degree of cooperation is affected by

agreements and government policies (Brady, [1943] 1971; Etzioni, [1968] 1970; Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).

Bargaining may take place at the sector, company, plant, or individual level. In coordinated bargaining, an attempt is made to achieve related outcomes in separate negotiations regarding the same company, union, or sector (Sisson and Marginson, 2002). The bargaining power of employers is extensive when labor demand is weak, while unions have a powerful bargaining position when demand for labor is strong (Galbraith, [1952] 1970; Layder, [1985] 1994). Negotiations between employers and unions include attempts to resolve conflicts of interests (distributive bargaining); solve problems confronting both parties (integrative bargaining); and achieve consensus within interacting groups (intra-organizational bargaining) (Sisson and Marginson, 2002). Bargaining may be peaceful, but it may also settle into a use of unemployment, restrictions of work and output, strikes, shut-downs and lock-outs, espionage, pickets, and menacing language (Veblen, 1899; [1923] 1994). Management may attempt to break the solidarity of the work force and, through the media, to undermine its societal support. On their part, unions may go on strike. A long strike may exhaust the strike fund, putting pressure on unions to make concessions. Workers on strike risk losing their jobs, while the company may go bankrupt. The pressure of a strike deadline forces union and management negotiators to make concessions (Walker, [1943] 1971; Bendix, [1959] 1964). Regular disputes may arise over compensation and career development. The steps to be taken to resolve such disputes may be spelled out in the labor contract. Labor relations specialists and special committees may be used (Marsden, 1999). According to Durkheim ([1893] 1926), industrial conflicts and disputes are weakened by the presence of professional groups. Moral rules and professional law and norms oblige professionals to act according to occupational goals, to make concessions, and to consent to compromises. In the end, bargaining may lead to collective agreements, establishing compensation systems and work rules. Centralised bargaining structures tend to display greater wage equality than those where bargaining is fragmented. Collective bargaining tends to boost workers' compensation, which may lead companies to replace workers with capital (Filella and Hegewisch, 1994; Knoke and Kalleberg, 1996).

Codetermination refers to participation of workers at company level in supervisory boards and/or works councils. Works councils have information, consultation, and codetermination rights in personnel, social, and economic affairs. They are legally independent from unions; they are not allowed to initiate a strike. Because of their position

between company and unions, they have a capability for regulating conflict. But they may enter firm-specific agreements that do not accord with union policy (Frege, 2002).

Crouch (1993b, 2000) distinguishes between contestative, pluralist, bargained or neo-corporatist, and authoritarian corporatist industrial relations systems. In contestation, employers and employees are alienated. Interaction takes the form of conflict in terms of strikes or lock-outs. In pluralist bargaining, there are lurches in employer strategy from conciliation to conflict. Procedures may exist to conduct conflicts in such a way that damaging action is avoided. In bargained or neo-corporatism, conflicts occur in the context of the pursuit of certain joint interests. Employers may try to convince labour that its pursuit of conflictual goals jeopardizes achieving the joint goal. In technical neo-corporatism, employers and unions discuss documents with statistical projections and policy plans. In social pact neo-corporatism, documents deal with simple strategic goals and moral appeals. Authoritarian corporatism is a hypothetical case with identity of capital and labour.

6.6. The Labor Force

The labor force may be segmented in terms of function, level, and education. Differences may exist in abilities, motivation, productivity, values, norms, beliefs, and commitment. Diversity can stimulate creativity, innovation, better problem solving, and flexibility, but it can also lead to conflict. Motivation, commitment, and morale have been found to rise with shifts from low to high in the hierarchy. Older workers are also more committed. Commitment leads to lower turnover and absenteeism, and higher effort. Job satisfaction breeds identification and loyalty, and decreases turnover and absenteeism (Parsons and Smelser, 1956; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Powell, 1991; Kanter, 2000).

Managers may have different aims, such as profit maximization, effectiveness, stability, approval, status, and power. They may also want to provide employment, advance well-being, secure the free enterprise system, train employees, and provide for employee influence (Veblen, 1899, [1923] 1994; Galbraith, [1984] 1986; Granovetter, [1985] 1992; Staehle, 1990). The Centre for Creative Leadership distinguishes five types of managers. Traditional managers assess facts before acting, are loyal to the status quo, and place a high value on order and punctuality. They are excellent coordinators and integrators. Troubleshooters and negotiators are problem-solvers. Catalysts care for people; they are good in public relations. Visionaries are planners and innovators. They may lose interest and search for new challenges (Kakabadse, Ludlow, and Vinnicombe, 1987).

6.7. HRM Systems

A number of HRM systems have been distinguished. Bureaucratic HRM relies on making jobs as simple as possible at the bottom with the supervisory structure entirely responsible for coordination. Careers begin at a low hierarchical level followed by promotion within specialized chains of command. Job evaluation generates a pay-for-the-job system. Superiors evaluate employees on the basis of qualifications, compliance, and willingness to pass information and supervise subordinates. Problems are taken to supervisors for resolution according to procedure. Employees are treated on an equal basis. Bureaucratic HRM may provide a competent, compliant, efficient work force in stable situations (Beer *et al.*, 1984).

The market approach to HRM is based on explicit exchanges between the organization and its members. Work is broken down into discrete tasks that are filled by a bidding process. There can be individual as well as group contracting. The flow system is 'in-and-out', as employees are hired and fired according to short-term needs. Turnover is high. Employees come into the system at any level. The market for jobs is both internal and external. Selection policies focus on matching employee skills to immediate task requirements, and hiring decisions are based on technical fit. Compensation is according to piece-rates, executive performance bonuses, sales commissions, merit increases, cash awards, prizes, and recognition. Employees may influence a market-oriented firm through negotiation and bargaining, individually or collectively by means of unions. The market-oriented HRM system has been found to be effective when flexibility is important (Beer *et al.*, 1984; Beechler and Bird, 1994).

The welfare corporatist approach includes tall and elaborate hierarchies; formal rules; a flexible division of labor with job rotation; and an extensive use of teams, based on cross-training and task-sharing to create shared purpose and effort, interchangeability, enrichment, and group independence. Permanent employment guarantees to core workers induce effort, reduce turnover, and increase commitment. Personnel is hired on the basis of the willingness and ability to learn skills, the ability to cooperate, and a personal fit with the firm. Internal labor markets provide mobility opportunities; they facilitate an informal exchange of skills. The point of entry is at a lower hierarchical level and mobility is upward or lateral. Promotion is based on seniority, while people who are promoted fit with the company culture. Training is extensive. Employees are prepared for roles and responsibilities in teams, while supervisors are trained in their roles as coaches and advisers to teams. There is an emphasis on employee

development on the basis of firm-specific skills. Pay is based on seniority, skills, and gains-sharing. This ties the interests of workers to that of the organization. Units break up occupational and class loyalties while encouraging organization-wide cohesive bonds. Job rotation and enlargement offer intrinsic rewards and build identification with the organization. Tasks are group-coordinated, with peer pressure as motivator, and decision-making is decentralized. Worker input occurs through consultation, discussion, consensus, suggestion programs, and problem-solving groups. This reinforces commitment. Communication is extensive. Formalized rights and obligations confers citizenship on employees, while formal dispute procedures provide legitimacy. Employee evaluation relies on the judgments of peers as well as superiors. The distance between managers and workers is small, and relations with workmates and managers are broad and warm. Status differentials are minimized so as to facilitate labor-management cooperation. This improves communication and commitment. High importance is attached to ritual, ceremony, symbolism, and benefits. Labor-management relations are consultative, and there are joint labor-management committees. The corporatist approach has been found to increase productivity and quality under product variety (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Beechler and Bird, 1994; Ichniowski *et al.*, 2000; Pudelko, 2000).

HRM systems are affected by the power and interests of stakeholders; management philosophy and strategy; the size of the organization; its financial situation; the political, legal, and educational system; societal values, norms, and ideologies; markets; and technology. HRM decisions have immediate effects (commitment, competence, congruence, cost effectiveness) and long-term effects (well-being, organizational effectiveness). The effect on performance depends on its fit with the environment (Pieper, 1990; Paauwe, 1998). HR practices may be stable when they are accepted as the norm, and patterns of interaction, communication, and trust develop. Powerholders may wish to frustrate change, and live and let live cooperation may develop between management and employees. Common mandates for change are the retirement and replacement of a top manager and a significant deterioration in performance (Donaldson, [1994] 1997; Pil and MacDuffie, 2000).

Discussion

In this paper, I have aimed to contribute to exposing the concept of power by bringing ideas from different traditions of power research together in a single conceptual analysis. Thus I have connected studies concerned with powerstructures, forms of power, and the exercise of power - or 'power over' - to studies concerned with personal agency, situations,

fields, strategies, and interactions - or 'power to'. In addition, I have presented an overview of ideas derived from the HRM literature, which I feel is useful in understanding collective agency. Clearly, improvements could be made - particularly with regard to the understanding of situations, fields, strategies, interactions, and different collective agents. Nonetheless, I hope that this paper contributes to the understanding of power as a central concept for the social sciences.

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POWER

capacities, structures, and forms of power

- sources and means
- powerbasis
- powercapacity
- powerconstellations
- powerstructures
- forms of power

personal agency

- goals and values
- information gathering
- decision making
- intentions
- actions
- context

the exercise of power

- social control
 - force
 - coercion
 - manipulation
 - inducement
 - divide and conquer
 - coalition formation
 - heresthetic
 - agenda control, strategic voting, the manipulation of dimensions
 - deceit
 - rhetorics
 - use of authority
 - willingness to obey
 - participation
 - countervailing power
 - conflict
- legitimation
 - discourse, ideology, theories, myths, beliefs, rituals, symbols
- social influence
 - perceptions, emotions, motivations, behavior, cognitions
 - propaganda, rituals, charismatic periods

powereffects

- effects of actions
- active or passive
- intentional or unintentional

situations, fields, strategies, and interactions

- situations
- fields
- strategies
- interactions
 - coordination, cooperation, bargaining, exchange, competition, conflict

collective agency (in organizations)

- work flow / activity flow
 - formal organization, informal organization
- human resource flow / flow of members or citizens
 - staffing, career development, training
- compensation / (intrinsic) rewards
- governance
 - social control, legitimation, socialization
- industrial relations / class relations
- labor force / membership
- HRM systems

Figure 1. An Overview of the Concept of Power