Kiki Anastasakos (Temple University, USA)
E-mail: anastasako@comcast.net
Labor Aspects of Internationalization: Multinational Corporations and Employment Relations in the U.S. and Germany
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The paper examines the social and economic impact of globalization, particularly through multinational corporate investment activities such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions. It provides a critical assessment of the neo-liberal thesis that globalization inevitably leads to a single social and economic model, one characterized by weak labor unions, low labor costs, and deregulated workforces. Instead of convergence, the study argues, a mixed or "hybrid" socio-economic model is a more probable outcome, one that integrates new ideas but retains a large portion of traditional institutions and practices. Furthermore, the study maintains that, despite neo-liberal predictions of its demise, organized labor can play a vital role through successful cross-border collaborative strategies that counter the challenges of globalization.
The study examines two major cross-border merger/acquisition cases in the automobile and banking sectors involving German and American multinational corporations (the Daimler/Chrysler case and the Deutsche Bank/Bankers Trust case). The study brings organized labor back in the discourse on globalization by maintaining that the degree and nature of hybridization varies across firms based not only on corporate strategy but on organized labors' position within each firm.
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Tim Bartley (Indiana University, USA)
E-mail: bartleyt@indiana.edu
Institutional Emergence as Dynamic Contestation: The Evolution of Private Associations for Regulating Labor and Environmental Conditions
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Predominant accounts of how institutions emerge are often limited by a focus on either the importation of pre-formed cultural models or the invention of solutions to collective action problems. This paper begins to develop an account of institutional emergence and evolution that is more dynamic and attentive to political conflicts involving firms, social movements, and states. I analyze the creation of private systems for regulating labor conditions in the apparel field and environmental conditions in the forest products field. Similar systems for certifying and monitoring companies (and sometimes labeling products) emerged in these two fields in the 1990s. By looking across these two cases and across different time periods, I show how conflicts between companies and challengers at one point in time shaped the process of institutional evolution at later times. For example, firms initial moves of symbolic compliance with political pressures generated additional demands from activists, leading to more elaborate ways of verifying companies' claims. Similarly, the power struggles generated by initial attempts to create certification associations fueled the rise of competing programs and the coevolution of models of certification and monitoring. The empirical analysis is based on interviews, coding of trade journals, and historical records.
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Uwe Becker (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
E-mail: Becker@pscw.uva.nl
(Consensual) Corporatism as a Variety of Capitalism: the Small Northwest-European Political Economies in International Comparison.
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The small Northwest-European political economies of the Alpine region, Scandinavia and the Netherlands have performed very well in the decade up to 2000/2001. Their GDP growth rates have been above OECD average (though Switzerland was a laggard), employment has reached (or consolidated at) levels higher than anywhere else and their relatively generous welfare systems have proven relatively resistant against the challenges supposed to stem from globalization. It is not a surprise therefore that these countries and particularly their corporatist arrangements of coordinating economic and social targets are internationally discussed as models. Just as surprising, however, is that it is not asked whether these political economies or to be more precise whether corporatist capitalism is a specific variety of capitalism with a specific nexus of market, political regulation and welfare system. This paper discusses this question. The answer is positive: corporatism is a specific form of socio-economic regulation and in this regard distinct from liberal, etatist and communitarian varieties. Looking at institutional advantages of corporatism in international competition the findings are rather negative or mixed at best, however. Not all of the small corporatist political economies are quality producers and the level of systemic complementarity is limited.
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Yang Cao (University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA)
E-mail: yangcao@email.uncc.edu
Why Did Chinese Firms Downsize?
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The late 1990s had witnessed a massive wave of corporate downsizing in the People's Republic of China. While many scholars have investigated the procedures and consequences of these layoffs, there is little research that systematically examines what led so many Chinese firms to reduce their workforces in the first place. This paper seeks to fill in the gap. I argue that the two popular approaches in the downsizing literature-the economic/strategic approach and the institutional approach-are inadequate, and a political economy perspective is needed in order to capture the power-based interplay behind the firm's decision making process. In China, local governments and state officials were generally predisposed against downsizing due to its negative impacts on the locality. Thus, even though legislative changes in the early 1990s had already granted each firm the legal freedom to downsize, the actual achievement of employment reduction was determined, to a significant degree, by the firm's bargaining power over the state. Statistical analysis of ~900 manufacturing firms reveals that large firms, Township-Village Enterprises, and firms with joint ventures with foreign partners were the most likely to have downsized. These findings lend strong support to the political economy perspective.
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Alexander Ebner (University of Erfurt, Germany)
E-mail: alexander.ebner@uni-erfurt.de
Governance and Collective Action: Reconstructing the Economic Borders of the State
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The state capacity in steering economic processes seems to have declined due to the impact of globalisation. This is associated with an evolution of governance mechanisms which transcend the separation of states and markets, involving actors both from the private and public sector. Thus, associated with the variety of institutional forms in capitalist market economies, the changing economic role of the state together with the dynamism of collective action provide a crucial domain for further analytical efforts. In particular, the 'new' institutionalism has contributed to these efforts, as informed by Olson's theory of collective action. The paper reconstructs Olson's anti-pluralist argumentation, highlighting the support for corporatist arrangements by proposing that encompassing interest groups serve considerations of social welfare more probably than small interest groups. However, this perspective does not account for an increasing complexity of institutional patterns. Thus, in confronting the Olsonian position, a modified account of collective action is taken to the fore that explores the role of governance and networks. In dealing with the matter of institutional variety, this socio-economic perspective conceives a reappraisal of pluralist ideas, while accounting for the limitations of government and the problems of interest group activity.
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Alexandre Sampaio Ferraz (University of Sao Paulo, Brazil)
E-mail: azferraz@uol.com.br
The Role of Governments and Trade Unions in the Privatization Process: An Analysis of the Telecommunication Sector in Comparative Perspective
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State intervention in the economic process as a producer of goods and services was once a common strategy adopted by underdeveloped and developed countries around the globe. This type of intervention was particularly important in the industrial sector after the Second World War, but its roots in the public utilities and infra-structure sectors, like telecommunication, electricity and water, are much older than that (Holcombe, 1911). Following the world economic crisis of the seventies and early eighties, however, several countries began to refrain from this kind of intervention and, as an alternative to control the fiscal balance, and promote economic growth. At this moment, privatization was placed on the political agenda as part of a broad strategy designed to reduce the size of the state, adjust its financial capacity, and foster the efficiency of state owned enterprises by isolating them from political influence (SOE).
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Lorenzo Giasanti (Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy)
E-mail: Lorenzo.Giasanti@unimi.it
Fixed Term Contract between Precariousness and Opportunity: The Problem of the Breach by the Employee
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Since mid-1980s many European countries have been increasing the use of temporary contracts. Recently these forms of work have had a real upgrowth in all of Europe.
It is commonly thought that temporary contracts are instruments less "attractive" than permanent ones. There are many studies that underline the fact that temporary jobs are usually paid less, are associated with lower satisfaction in some job components and provide less work-related training.
However, some economic studies have found that the use of short-term contracts could have implications for the duration and distribution of unemployment. Indeed during the search for a regular job, unemployed individuals may accept a temporary job as an intermediate position. This means that fixed-term contracts could effectively be used as stepping-stones to permanent jobs.
On the other hand some studies describe the risks of the "precariousness trap" that could be caused by the intensive use of temporary jobs.
This paper, starting from the economic and social debate, will analyse the impact of these problems from a juridical point of view. The new short-term contract Italian law, that was based on the agreement between employer association and part of trade unions confederation (without the consent of CGIL, the largest Italian confederation), has introduce new problems. In this case we are particularly interested in the problem of the breach of the contract by the employee in the case that she/he finds a better permanent job.
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Nicolas D. Hasanagas (Goettingen University, Germany)
E-mail: (nhasana@gwdg.de)
Measuring negotiation effectiveness of economic interest groups in macro-corporatism
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Basic question of this article is whether the economic interest groups are capable of successfully negotiating under conditions of macro-corporatism (dominant state, high institutionalization, large number of private actors of several sectors). We are going to argue that the more a policy network obtains macro-corporatist character, the weaker the negotiation potential of the economic interest groups becomes (both in public and scientific debate). This work is methodically based on quantitative network analysis and theoretically on Network theory and in part Theory of Organized Interests.
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Lane Kenworthy and John Iceland (Emory University, USA)
E-mail: lkenwor@emory.edu
U.S. Poverty in the 1980s and 1990s: A State Level Analysis
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Analyses of determinants of poverty typically aim to sort out the relative importance of macroeconomic conditions (growth, unemployment), human capital (education), earnings inequality, demographic characteristics (single-headed households, minority population, immigrant population, age structure of the population), earnings inequality, and government social-welfare policy. Studies of the United States or other national cases have focused on longitudinal developments and generally used an absolute measure of poverty. Cross-country studies have concentrated on variation in levels of poverty and used a relative poverty measure. We attempt to bridge these two related but heretofore disconnected literatures. With data from the Luxembourg Income Study and the U.S. Current Population Survey, we analyze variation in poverty across 14 affluent countries and across the 48 contiguous U.S. states during the 1980s and 1990s. We focus on cross-country and cross-state variation in change over time. We use both an absolute and a relative measure of poverty. Our poverty measure incorporates not just the rate but also the intensity of poverty (poverty gap). We include the same causal variables in both sets of analyses.
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Stefano Sacchi (University of Pavia and Research Unit on European Governance URGE, Turin, Italy)
E-mail: stefano.sacchi@uni-bocconi.it
The OMC and National Institutional Capabilities: The Italian Experience as a Heuristic Case Study
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Although primarily intended to orienting Member States' policies towards common strategic priorities, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has also the ambition to make an impact on policymaking arrangements as such. The OMC can thus be seen as an experiment in the promotion of policy change on a continental basis, geared towards modifying not only policy objectives and measures but also the interaction dynamics among the actors in the policy areas involved, pursuing four 'processual objectives': Vertical integration, Horizontal integration, Cross-sectoral integration and Strengthening MS's institutional capabilities.
The paper focuses on the degree to which Italy has pursued the fourth process objective in the fields of employment and social inclusion policies. It has two theoretical ambitions: to clarify and systematize the concept of institutional capability and build an analytical framework for the study of the effects of the OMC on such capability within MS's policymaking systems; and to exploit the study of the Italian experience as a heuristic case study to generate hypotheses about the effects of the OMC on MS's policymaking modes, on the background of the Europeanization debate. To this aim, Italy's experience is contrasted with that of Sweden and the Netherlands.
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Helene Schuberth (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Austria)
E-mail: helene.schuberth@oenb.co.at
Agency Independence and Economic Policy Rules
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In Western Europe, governments are increasingly willing to delegate major macroeconomic competencies to specialized institutions of experts that are beyond their direct control, the recent proposal of establishing an independent fiscal council being a case in point. Democratic legitimacy of such institutions, so the argument, is achieved by compelling those institutions to follow policy rules. Within a principal-agent setting, rules are defined as technical procedures followed by the independent authority (agent) to maximize economic policy goals set by the general public (principal). In this view, rules symbolizing the collective wisdom of society represent the best alternative for governance. Herewith, policy rules are discussed as substitutes for democracy.
We show for the monetary and fiscal policy case that democratic legitimacy and agency independence cannot be reconciled by obliging the independent agent to follow rules: Given data, model and goal uncertainty, respective 'optimal' solutions adopted by experts can be derived for many different mental and cognitive constructions of economic causalities and preferences regarding economic policy goals. The respective agent will - with or without a rule - act according to the wise men's belief. To strengthen accountability, we suggest adapting some of the ideas of deliberative democracy for economic policy institutions and procedures.
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Marco Simoni (London School of Economics, UK)
E-mail: m.simoni@lse.ac.uk
Social Democratic Parties and Trade Unions in Deflationist Times
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This paper aims at challenging conventional theory according to which the abandonment of Keynesianism by social democratic governments entailed a 'divorce' between once very close parties and trade unions. During the 1980s and 1990s, Social Democratic parties endorsed the new economic consensus grounded on restrictive monetary policies. Nonetheless, a collaborative relationship between social democratic governments and trade unions is apparent in a relevant number of European countries. Meanwhile, in different countries a 'new' kind of adversarial relationship apparently tracks the 'divorce' theory, as in late 1990s Britain. Contrary to any expectation however, this adversarial relationship paired with redistributive outcomes favourable to wage earners. Arguably, other things must be at stake, more than a general political economy stance, in order to explain different types of party/unions relationships throughout Europe. The paper concludes by drawing an alternative explanation on the causal factors of the party/unions relationship to be tested through further research. Reversing the causal direction of the conventional explanation, it argues that the nature of the relationship depends on the characters of trade unions movement. Parties and unions will benefit from a collaborative relationship, only if the latter embed in their programs and attitudes the substance of an encompassing union.
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Els Sol (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
E-mail: sol@jur.uva.nl
Reintegration strategies in changing governance arrangements
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Traditionally many European countries have known a strong liaison between the government, employer associations and the trade unions. These tripartite arrangements are expressed in different welfare regimes. Currently shifts in governance arrangements occur and we see politicians resume their political primacy in various domains.
In the domain of welfare to work there are changing strategies to bring people back into the labour market. We can distinguish between the work-first strategies and human capital strategies. Work-first approaches prioritise labour market attachment on the premise that any job is better than none. Human capital approaches prioritise the development of the social attitudes and marketable skills that will equip people to find and retain suitable jobs.
In this paper we focus on the relation between the changing balance amongst government and partners and reintegration strategies. In what way do reintegration strategies depend on the changing governance arrangements and what are the consequences for sustainable integration of people in jobs?
The paper analyses the position of the three partners in the current welfare to work employment services, their strategies and the forces behind the shift in governance in 5 countries with different regimes (UK-France-Germany-Denmark and the Netherlands).
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Matt Vidal ( University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA)
E-mail: mvidal@ssc.wisc.edu
Lean Production, Worker "Empowerment," and Job Satisfaction
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Increased use of participatory work practices is seen by many as a defining factor of recent industrial restructuring in the US. Within manufacturing, increased employee involvement through practices such as teamwork and continuous improvement is argued to be central to "lean" or "high performance" work organization. The alleged increase in the responsibilities and abilities of front-line workers has been labeled "empowerment" by many academics, business gurus and practitioners. Such "empowerment" is said to increase job satisfaction, primarily through increased intrinsic rewards. Yet, surprisingly little of the qualitative data is based on actually talking to workers, and the quantitative evidence is much less clear than often presented. I argue that the relationship between worker empowerment and job satisfaction is much more complex than the standard view suggests. Based on interviews with workers I show that workers can be very satisfied without being "empowered" and that increasing involvement, especially at high levels, does not necessarily lead to increased satisfaction. I fortify my qualitative analysis of workers' experience with a quantitative analysis of data from the General Social Survey, which show that the relationship between increased involvement and job satisfaction is (a) non-linear, and (b) mediated by individual expectations regarding work.
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Geoffrey Wood (Middlesex University, United Kingdom)
E-mail: geoffreywood65@hotmail.com
International Homogenization or the Persistence of National Practices?: The Remaking of Industrial Relations in Mozambique
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A central concern of the contemporary literature on industrial relations in Africa is the consequences of intensified global competition and the espousal of neo-liberal policies by national governments. In most cases, it is assumed that this has exacerbated existing institutional weaknesses, resulting in the proliferation of labour repressive policies (Frynas and Wood 2003; Moody 1997; c.f. Hanlon 1996). However, there is some evidence to suggest that, in certain cases, these pressures have been counterbalanced through the development of more pluralist and inclusivist practices at firm-level (Wood and Els 2000; Wood and Sela 2000). This paper evaluates the present state of labour relations in Mozambique, assesses the extent to which specific sets of practices are associated with particular regions and/or sectors, and explores the relationship between IR practice and national institutional configurations. Finally, it seeks to highlight the lessons that can be drawn from the Mozambican experience for the analysis and practice of labour relations in other developing societies.
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